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[85] 
Resurrecting Health Care Rate Regulation 
Erin C. Fuse Brown* 
Our excess health care spending in the United States is driven largely by our high health 
care prices. Our prices are so high because they are undisciplined by market forces, in a 
health care system rife with market failures, which include information asymmetries, 
noncompetitive levels of provider market concentration, moral hazard created by health 
insurance, multiple principal-agent relationships with misaligned incentives, and 
externalities from unwarranted price variation and discrimination. These health care 
market failures invite a regulatory solution. An array of legal and policy solutions are 
typically advanced to control our health care prices and spending, including: (1) market 
solutions that focus on transparency and consumerism to discipline health care prices; 
(2) antitrust enforcement to promote competition in the provider market; (3) consumer 
protections that protect individual uninsured or underinsured patients from unfair prices; 
(4) health care payment and delivery reforms that alter financial incentives of health care 
providers to reduce overutilization and improve efficiency; and (5) regulation of provider 
payment rates. The literature on these health care policy approaches reflects the 
fragmentation of the U.S. health care system, typically considering each approach in 
isolation, and it is difficult to make sense of an a la carte menu of approaches. This 
Article sets forth an analytic framework to simultaneously and comprehensively evaluate 
all the policy solutions to discipline health care prices by measuring each solution for its 
ability to address the health care market failures. Applying this policy-against-market-
failure analysis leads to the following conclusion: only one solution—rate regulation—is 
capable of addressing the widespread and growing provider monopoly problem. More 
politically popular market approaches such as price transparency and payment and 
delivery reforms can correct the market failures from information asymmetries and 
principal-agent problems, but because they do not address the market power of providers, 
they will be ineffective to control health care prices and spending without accompanying 
rate regulation. It is time to resurrect rate regulation and place it squarely in the center of 
any policy strategy to control health care prices and spending. 
 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. My deepest 
appreciation to the Saint Louis University Center for Health Law Studies, and the American Society 
for Law, Medicine & Ethics for the opportunity to present an earlier version of this Article at the 2014 
Health Law Scholars Workshop. I would like to thank Charlotte Alexander, Heather Bednarek, John 
Cogan, John Jacobi, Kelly Dineen, Rob Gatter, Jesse Goldner, Tim Greaney, Mark Hall, Nicole 
Huberfeld, Lisa Ikemoto, Peter Jacobson, Sandra Johnson, Steve Kaminshine, Lauren Sudeall Lucas, 
Jessica Mantel, David Orentlicher, Nirej Sekhon, Elizabeth Sepper, Anne Tucker, Jason Turner, 
Deepa Varadarajan, Sidney Watson, and Ramsi Woodcock for their helpful comments and feedback. 
Many thanks to Genevieve Razick for her research assistance. All errors are my own. 
H - Fuse Brown_26 (Hamilton12.7) (Do Not Delete) 12/15/2015 6:00 PM 
86                                             HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:85 
Table of Contents 
Introduction .................................................................................................. 87 
I.  Health Care Prices and Market Failure ........................................... 92 
A.  Information Asymmetry ........................................................... 93 
B.  Noncompetitive Provider Markets ......................................... 94 
C.  Moral Hazard and Third Party Payment ............................ 96 
D.  Principal-Agent Problems ....................................................... 98 
E.  Externalities of Irrational Hospital Prices ..................... 102 
II.  Policy Solutions Evaluated Against Market Failures .............. 103 
A.  Market Solutions .................................................................... 103 
1.  Price Transparency .............................................................. 104 
2.  Consumer-Directed Health Care ........................................ 107 
3.  Reference Pricing ................................................................. 109 
4.  Tiering and Narrow Networks ........................................... 111 
5.  Market Approaches Measured Against Health Care 
Market Failures .................................................................... 112 
B.  Antitrust Enforcement.......................................................... 114 
1.  Antitrust Strategies to Address Hospital Market Power .. 114 
2.  Antitrust Strategies Measured Against Health Care 
Market Failures .................................................................... 115 
C.  Payment and Delivery Reforms ............................................ 118 
1.  ACOs and Bundled Payments ........................................... 118 
2.  Payment and Delivery Reforms Measured Against 
Health Care Market Failures .............................................. 120 
D.  Consumer Protections ............................................................ 121 
1.  Contract Law and Muscular Supervisory Doctrines ........ 122 
2.  Hospital Fair Pricing and Balance Billing Laws .............. 125 
3.  Consumer Protections Measured Against Health Care 
Market Failures .................................................................... 128 
E.  Rate Regulation ..................................................................... 128 
1.  All Payer Rate Setting ......................................................... 129 
2.  Caps on Negotiated Prices for Private Health Plans ........ 133 
3.  Global Budgets .................................................................... 133 
4.  Rate Regulation Measured Against Health Care 
Market Failures .................................................................... 135 
III.  Resurrecting Health Care Rate Regulation .............................. 137 
A.  Conclusions for Noncompetitive Provider Markets ........ 137 
B.  What to Do with Competitive Health Care Markets ...... 140 
Conclusion .................................................................................................. 141 
H - Fuse Brown_26 (Hamilton12.7) (Do Not Delete) 12/15/2015 6:00 PM 
December 2015]        RESURRECTING HEALTH CARE RATE REGULATION 87 
Introduction 
In the United States we spend considerably more on health care than 
any other wealthy, developed country whether measured as a percentage 
of GDP or on a per capita basis.1 According to health economists, the 
explanation of our excess health care spending is: “It’s the prices, stupid.”2 
We spend more in the United States on health care because our health 
care prices are high. That may sound like a tautology, but it is not.3 
Higher health care expenditures in the United States might alternatively 
be explained by higher consumption, that we are sicker or fatter than our 
counterparts in Europe or Asia, that we have more defensive medicine as 
a result of our malpractice system, or that we have higher administrative 
costs from our fragmented and complicated system of providers and 
payers.4 However, none of these factors sufficiently explain our excess 
health care spending.5 The story of our unchecked health care spending in 
the United States is a story about high and undisciplined prices.6 The price 
dynamics of our health care system are epitomized by the chaotic and 
complex pricing system for hospital services, which are an outsized 
exemplar of the larger pricing problem in U.S. health care. 
The nonsystem for hospital pricing is particularly bewildering when 
observed on the level of the individual patient. Hospital services are 
among the most expensive things we will buy in our lifetime, but we do 
not shop for hospital care like any other similarly large purchase, such as 
 
 1. Luca Lorenzoni et al., Health-Care Expenditure and Health Policy in the USA Versus Other 
High-Spending OECD Countries, 384 Lancet 83, 83 (2014). 
 2. Gerard F. Anderson et al., It’s The Prices, Stupid: Why The United States Is so Different From 
Other Countries, 22 Health Aff. 89, 103 (2003). 
 3. In the health care context, the terms “price,” “spending,” “cost,” and “charge” have different 
and often confused meanings. In this Article, health care prices are the amounts a provider expects to 
be paid by payers and patients for the items and services rendered; health care spending is the amount 
of expenditures by public (government) and/or private households or institutions on health care goods 
and services; health care costs are the direct and indirect input costs to the provider incurred to deliver 
the health care services to the patients; and charges are the rates the provider sets for a given item or 
service before any negotiated or governmental discounts. See Healthcare Fin. Mgmt. Ass’n, Price 
Transparency in Health Care: Report from the HFMA Price Transparency Task Force 5–7 (2014); 
Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., OECD Factbook 2011–2012: Economic Environmental and 
Social Statistics (2011), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/factbook-2011-en/12/03/03/index.html?/ 
ns/Chapter&itemId=/content/chapter/factbook-2011-112-en (defining health expenditure). 
 4. Gerard F. Anderson et al., Health Spending in the United States and the Rest of the 
Industrialized World, 24 Health Aff. 903, 904 (2005); Hamilton Moses III et al., The Anatomy of 
Health Care in the United States, 310 JAMA 1947, 1949 (2013). 
 5. U.S. health care spending is “excess” in the sense that it exceeds the amount that one would 
expect the United States to spend given its wealth in comparison to other OECD countries. Based on 
national income and health spending in other OECD countries, analysts would expect the United 
States to spend about eleven percent of GDP on health care (or $4849 per capita), far less than the 
more than seventeen percent of GDP (or nearly $8000 per capita) than it does spend. David Squires, 
Explaining High Health Care Spending in the United States: An International Comparison of Supply, 
Utilization, Prices, and Quality, 10 Commonwealth Fund, May 2012, at 3. 
 6. Anderson et al., supra note 2, at 103. 
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a house, a car, or a college degree. Hospital prices are not just high; they 
are almost completely impenetrable and senseless to the patient-consumer, 
characterized by extreme variation, price discrimination, opacity, and 
complexity.7 Most hospitals will not (or cannot) reveal the price of an 
MRI, hip replacement, or any other hospital service until they have 
already delivered the care and the bill.8 The same service may cost a 
fraction of the price at a hospital just a few miles away.9 The price 
patients are charged depends on who is paying and the hospital’s market 
power, not its costs or quality.10 If the patient is paying for the hospital 
care out-of-pocket, she may pay double what an insurance company would 
pay, and three times what Medicare pays.11 Many individuals go bankrupt, 
lose their homes to liens or foreclosure, have their wages seized, or their 
credit damaged as a result of unaffordable hospital bills and aggressive 
debt collection practices.12 The chaos and lack of restraint in hospital 
pricing creates enormous personal and systemic harms as both prices and 
patients’ share of their health care costs rise. The problems of excess U.S. 
health care spending and the bewildering individual experience of hospital 
billing stem from a failure of markets to discipline prices in the health care 
system. 
The market for health care services is beset by features of market 
failure.13 The U.S. health care system is characterized by information 
 
 7. Erin C. Fuse Brown, Irrational Hospital Pricing, 14 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol’y 11, 15–29 
(2014). 
 8. Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind a Veil of Secrecy, 
25 Health Aff. 57, 64–66 (2006). 
 9. Office of Info. Prods. and Data Analytics, The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, Medicare Fee-For Service Provider Utilization and Payment Data Inpatient Public Use 
File: A Methodological Overview 3 (2014), http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/Medicare-Provider-Charge-Data/Inpatient.html; accord Editorial, 
The Murky World of Hospital Prices, N.Y. Times (May 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
05/17/opinion/the-murky-world-of-hospital-prices.html; Sarah Kliff & Dan Keating, One Hospital Charges 
$8,00 — Another, $38,000, Wash. Post Wonkblog (May 8, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/08/one-hospital-charges-8000-another-38000/. 
 10. Office of the Att’y Gen. Martha Coakley, Examination of Health Care Cost Trends 
and Cost Drivers Pursuant to G.L. c. 118G, § 61/2(b): Report for Annual Public Hearing 3, 16–
27 (2010), http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/healthcare/2010-hcctd-full.pdf [hereinafter Massachusetts 
AG 2010 Report]. 
 11. See Reinhardt, supra note 8, at 62; Gerard Anderson, From ‘Soak the Rich’ To ‘Soak the 
Poor’: Recent Trends in Hospital Pricing, 26 Health Aff. 780, 781 (2007). 
 12. Melissa B. Jacoby & Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An Alternative 
Account of Medical-Related Financial Distress, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 535, 548–49 (2006); Christopher 
Tarver Robertson et al., Get Sick, Get Out: The Medical Causes of Home Mortgage Foreclosures, 
18 Health Matrix 65, 66–68 (2008). 
 13. See, e.g., Competition in the Healthcare Marketplace: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On 
Consumer Protection, Prod. Safety & Ins. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Trans., 111th Cong. 
15 (2009) (statement of Len M. Nichols, Dir., Health Policy Program, New America Foundation); 
Thomas L. Greaney, Chicago’s Procrustean Bed: Applying Antitrust Law in Health Care, 71 Antitrust 
L.J. 857, 862–63 (2004); Bruce C. Vladeck & Thomas Rice, Market Failure and the Failure of 
Discourse: Facing up to the Power of Sellers, 28 Health Aff. 1305, 1306 (2009); Bruce C. Vladeck, 
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asymmetries where price and quality information are virtually 
undiscoverable to patients; noncompetitive markets in which providers 
with market power charge supracompetitive, monopoly prices; moral 
hazard created by third-party financing of health care; principal-agent 
problems arising from the web of intermediaries standing between a 
patient and her health care; and financial and health-related externalities 
from unmanageable medical debt that are borne by individuals and 
society as a whole. Of these, the single most important factor driving our 
health care pricing problem is a noncompetitive provider market. 
The failure of the market for health care services invites regulatory 
intervention, and there is an array of legal and policy solutions 
policymakers may pursue to control health care prices and spending. 
These solutions fall into several categories: (1) market solutions that focus 
on consumerism, price competition, and transparency to discipline health 
care prices; (2) antitrust enforcement to protect competition in the 
provider market; (3) health care payment and delivery reforms that alter 
financial incentives of providers to reduce overutilization and improve 
efficiency; (4) consumer protections that protect financially vulnerable 
patients from unconscionable prices and onerous debt collection practices; 
and (5) rate regulation in the form of all-payer rate setting, price caps, or 
global budgets. 
Considerable scholarship from health law and policy literature, as 
well as health economics, delve into the evaluation of some of these 
approaches to solve our health care pricing and spending problem. The 
literature, however, reflects the fragmentation and complexity of our 
health care system14 because each study tends to focus on individual 
solutions in isolation, such as evaluations of health care price transparency,15 
recommendations for accountable care organizations (“ACOs”),16 critiques 
 
Paradigm Lost: Provider Concentration and the Failure of Market Theory, 33 Health Aff. 1083, 1083 
(2014). 
 14. See, e.g., The Fragmentation of U.S. Health Care: Causes and Solutions 3–6 (Einer 
Elhauge ed., 2010). 
 15. See David Cutler & Leemore Dafny, Designing Transparency Systems for Medical Care 
Prices, 364 N. Eng. J. Med. 894 (2011); Morgan A. Muir et al., Clarifying Costs: Can Increased Price 
Transparency Reduce Healthcare Spending?, 4 Wm. & Mary Pol’y Rev. 319 (2013); Anna D. Sinaiko & 
Meredith B. Rosenthal, Increased Price Transparency in Health Care – Challenges and Potential 
Effects, 364 N. Eng. J. Med. 891 (2013); Andrew Steinmetz & Ezekiel Emanuel, What Does a Hip 
Replacement Cost? The Transparency Imperative in 2013, 173 JAMA Internal Med. 432 (2013); Peter 
A. Ubel, Can Patients in the United States Become Savvy Health Care Consumers?, 92 N.C. L. Rev. 
1749 (2014). 
 16. See, e.g., Rudy Douven et al., Avoiding Unintended Incentives in ACO Payment Models, 34 
Health Aff. 143, 143–47 (2015); see Elliott S. Fisher et al., A Framework for Evaluating the 
Formation, Implementation, and Performance of Accountable Care Organizations, 31 Health Aff. 
2368 (2012); Thomas L. Greaney, Regulators as Market-Makers: Accountable Care Organizations and 
Competition Policy, 46 Ariz. St. L.J. 1 (2014). 
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of health care antitrust enforcement,17 or analysis of contract-based 
approaches to control health care prices.18 
This Article is the first to consider all the policy approaches 
simultaneously and comprehensively, using one overarching analytic 
framework. Using this framework, this Article systematically evaluates 
the viability of each of the policy solutions to discipline health care prices 
by assessing the degree to which each strategy addresses the various 
health care market failures. This policy-against-market-failure approach 
reveals each policy’s relative strengths and blind spots, and the 
comprehensive consideration of all of the approaches together tells a 
story of a dynamic system where fixing one market failure may exacerbate 
others, and ultimately undermine the goals of restraining health care 
prices and spending. It is critical for policymakers to consider the dynamic 
interplay between the different market failures and menu of solutions to 
craft a legal or policy approach that actually has a chance of correcting a 
failed market of the size, complexity, and importance of the U.S. health 
care system. 
In applying the policy-against-market-failure framework, this 
Article accepts each of the legal and policy solutions to control health 
care prices on its merits, construing each solution in a light most 
favorable to the proponents who typically advance the policy. The 
conclusions from the analysis are sobering. When evaluating the strategies 
to control health care prices for their ability to address market failures, all 
except rate regulation fall short when applied to noncompetitive health 
care provider markets. In particular, the policy approaches that are most 
politically popularmarket approaches and payment and delivery 
reformswill not control health care prices in concentrated markets. For 
the increasing preponderance of noncompetitive health care provider 
markets, the only policy capable of addressing the market power of 
providers is rate regulation, because no amount of competitive pressure 
will create choices for consumers where none exist. The primary conclusion 
of this analysis is that for the vast majority of jurisdictions with concentrated 
provider markets, health care rate regulation must be a central part of any 
 
 17. David M. Cutler & Fiona Scott Morton, Hospitals, Market Share, and Consolidation, 310 
JAMA 1964, 196869 (2013); Thomas L. Greaney, Night Landings on an Aircraft Carrier: Hospital 
Mergers and Antitrust Law, 23 Am. J.L. & Med. 191, 192200 (1997); Clark C. Havighurst & Barak 
Richman, The Provider Monopoly Problem in Health Care, 89 Or. L. Rev. 847, 86871 (2011); Barak 
D. Richman, Antitrust and Nonprofit Hospital Mergers: A Return to Basics, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 121, 
140–48 (2007). 
 18. See Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the New 
Medical Marketplace, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 643 (2008); Barak D. Richman et al., Overbilling and 
Informed Financial Consent — A Contractual Solution, 367 N. Eng. J. Med. 396 (2012); Carl E. 
Schneider & Mark A. Hall, The Patient Life: Can Consumers Direct Health Care? 35 Am. J.L. & Med. 7 
(2009). 
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policy strategy to control health care spending. The analytic framework 
and this conclusion are summarized visually in Figure 1, set forth below. 
 
Figure 1: Policy Solutions Measured Against  
Health Care Market Failures 
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The second conclusion from this policy-against-market-failure analysis 
is that no single solution or approach is sufficient to address all the market 
failures, and a combination of approaches is necessary to correct the 
manifold health care market imperfections. What this means is that for 
noncompetitive provider markets, rate regulation should be augmented by 
payment and delivery reforms, because rate setting alone will not address 
the principal-agent problem of demand inducement by physicians and 
overutilization of health care. Noncompetitive markets could also benefit 
from the infusion of market forces to reward high-quality and high-value 
hospitals and ensure adequacy of supply of needed services. 
Part I describes the failures of the market for health care services. 
Part II sets forth the range of legal and policy solutions typically offered 
to discipline health care costs, and uses the policy-against-market-failure 
framework to evaluate each solution for its effectiveness at addressing 
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the various market failures. Part III then discusses the main conclusions 
from the comprehensive analysis and implications for choosing which 
policy solutions to deploy in a particular health care market to discipline 
prices in that market. 
I.  Health Care Prices and Market Failure 
Health care prices in the United States are excessive and inexplicable, 
and they matter tremendously to any effort to control our health care 
spending. Health care spending consumes more than seventeen percent 
of our GDP.19 Inpatient and outpatient hospital prices are the largest 
contributors to excess spending in U.S. health care.20 Moreover, high 
prices are the main reason we spend so much more in the United States 
for health care than other wealthy and developed countries, whether 
measured per capita or as a percentage of the economy.21 For the higher 
prices we pay, we do not get more or better quality care or better health 
outcomes.22 Health care prices account for most of the growth in U.S. health 
care spending, eclipsing the effects of increasing utilization, the aging or 
sickness of the population, the supply of health care services, or 
malpractice litigation and defensive medicine.23 Hospital prices are a key 
driver of the larger health care pricing problem in the United States, and 
the lack of market discipline of hospital prices is a prominent manifestation 
of what is wrong with the health care market as a whole. 
Evidence of the market failure for hospital services is borne out in 
what we can observe of the unwarranted variations in hospital prices. In 
a functioning market, price variations would relate to differences in costs, 
 
 19. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., National Health Expenditures 2013  
Highlights (2013), http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/highlights.pdf (noting that in 2013, national health 
expenditures in the United States comprised 17.4% of the gross domestic product, totaling $2.9 trillion 
or $9255 per person). 
 20. Anderson et al., supra note 2, at 101; Lorenzoni et al., supra note 1, at 89 (“Higher health 
sector prices explain much of the difference between the USA and other high-spending countries.”); 
Diana Farrell et al., McKinsey Global Inst., Accounting for the Cost of US Health Care: A 
New Look at Why Americans Spend More 1319, 21 (2008) (estimating, in 2008, that the United 
States spends $650 billion more on health care than would be expected for a country with its wealth, 
with inpatient and outpatient costs accounting for $476 billion, or seventy-three percent of the excess 
spending). 
 21. Anderson et al., supra note 2, at 103; Vladeck & Rice, supra note 13, at 130506. 
 22. See Vladeck & Rice, supra note 13, at 1306. 
 23. Anderson et al., supra note 4, at 904 (“We conclude that supply constraints and waiting lists 
do not appear to translate into significant savings in other countries and that malpractice and 
defensive medicine are responsible for only a small portion of the U.S. spending differential.”); Moses 
et al., supra note 4, at 1949 (“Between 2000 and 2011, increase in price (particularly of drugs, medical 
devices, and hospital care), not intensity of service or demographic change, produced most of the 
increase in health’s share of GDP.”). 
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quality, the sickness of the population, or patient preferences.24 Instead, 
variations in hospital prices are dictated by market power of the hospital, 
not the hospital’s costs, payer mix, quality, or whether it is a teaching 
hospital.25 Hospitals routinely engage in price discrimination, charging 
different prices to different payers for the same service.26 Hospital price 
discrimination is inefficient because the highest prices are charged to 
those with the least bargaining power and ability to pay, such as the 
uninsured or out-of-network patient. This health care price discrimination 
differs from the price discrimination practices in other industries like 
airlines or hotels, which are calibrated according to willingness to pay.27 
Indeed, the market for hospital services is rife with features of market 
failure: information asymmetries, noncompetitive markets, moral hazard, 
principal-agent problems, and externalities.  
A. Information Asymmetry 
The health care market overall, and the more limited market for 
hospital services, are shot through with information asymmetries. Kenneth 
Arrow famously identified information asymmetry in the form of 
“uncertainty in the incidence of disease and in the efficacy of treatment” 
as the primary reason for the health care market’s departure from the 
neoclassical competitive model.28 Health care information regarding 
diagnosis or treatment options is so specialized, the theory goes, that the 
patient lacks the information to assess the quality, cost, and nature of 
health care necessary to make a purchasing choice.29 
The information asymmetry problem goes beyond assessing the 
efficacy of a particular treatment. For hospital care, many informational 
deficits accumulate: the patient typically lacks the clinical knowledge to 
identify the items and services she will need; the price is nearly always 
inaccessible until after the service is rendered;30 the quality of the hospital 
 
 24. Paul B. Ginsburg, Ctr. For Studying Health Sys. Change, Wide Variation in Hospital 
and Physician Payment Rates Evidence of Provider Market Power 6 (2010). 
 25. See Massachusetts AG 2010 Report, supra note 10, at 3. 
 26. Uwe Reinhardt, Commentary, The Many Different Prices Paid to Providers and the Flawed 
Theory of Cost Shifting: Is It Time for a More Rational All-Payer System?, 30 Health Aff. 2125, 
212829 (2011). 
 27. N.J. Comm’n on Rationalizing Health Care Res., N.J. Dep’t of Health, Final Report 
9293 (2008). 
 28. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 941, 941 (1963). 
 29. See David Dranove & Mark A. Satterthwaite, The Industrial Organization of Health Care 
Markets, in 1B Handbook of Health Economics 1093, 1095 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. 
Newhouse eds., 2000). 
 30. Jaime Rosenthal et al., Availability of Consumer Prices from US Hospitals for Common 
Surgical Procedure, 173 JAMA Internal Med. 427 (2013) (finding that only sixteen percent of 
hospitals studied could provide a full price quote for a total hip replacement for a fictitious sixty-two-
year-old uninsured grandmother). 
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and various clinicians involved in the care (such as experience and track 
record or hospital error or infection rate) is notoriously difficult to 
measure and compare;31 and patients rarely are aware of the financial 
incentives for physicians involved in their care to order certain items or 
services or refer to particular providers.32 All of this information would be 
necessary for a patient to make informed health care decisions. 
Patients simply have inadequate information about the substance, 
quality, cost, and provider incentives to make informed choices about 
consuming hospital services. Information asymmetry with high search costs 
continues to drive market failure for hospital services. 
B. Noncompetitive Provider Markets 
Monopolies and excessive market power are another type of market 
failure that plagues health care provider markets.33 Loss of competition in 
health care is probably the most important driver of our health care pricing 
problem. Hospital markets in the United States are highly concentrated and 
are getting increasingly noncompetitive.34 To measure the competitiveness 
of a given health care market, antitrust agencies and economists use the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”).35 Under this measure, half of all 
hospital markets in the United States are considered highly concentrated, 
and no hospital market is highly competitive.36 The vast majority of large 
metropolitan areas in the United States have a highly concentrated hospital 
market,37 meaning most of the population lives in a noncompetitive market. 
The problem is worse in many rural areas, where hospitals have few if 
any competitors.38 The typical hospital market is noncompetitive: it has 
one dominant hospital system and two to three smaller systems that 
 
 31. Reinhardt, supra note 8, at 6566 (noting that information on price and quality are rarely 
available to the patient). 
 32. Greaney, supra note 13, at 864. 
 33. See Vladeck & Rice, supra note 13, at 1306. 
 34. See Cutler & Scott Morton, supra note 17, at 1966. 
 35. HHI is the sum of the squared market share of each hospital or hospital system in a given 
market multiplied by 10,000. Market share is calculated as proportional share of inpatient admissions 
or patient days possessed by a hospital relative the rest of the market. Thus, a market with only one 
hospital (a pure monopoly) would have an HHI of 10,000 and a market with two hospitals (a duopoly) 
would have an HHI of 5000. Typically, a market is considered “highly concentrated” if the HHI is 
greater than 2500, which means there are about four equal sized hospital owners in a given market. A 
market is “moderately concentrated” if its HHI is between 1500 and 2500. Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index, U.S. Dep’t of Just., http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hhi.html (last updated July 29, 
2015). 
 36. See Cutler & Scott Morton, supra note 17, at 1966. 
 37. Stephen Zuckerman & John Holahan, Urban Inst. Health Policy Ctr., Despite Criticism, 
The Affordable Care Act Does Much to Contain Costs 2 (2012), http://www.urban.org/ 
sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/412665-Despite-Criticism-The-Affordable-Care-Act-Does-
Much-to-Contain-Health-Care-Costs.PDF (noting that as of the mid-2000s, eighty-eight percent of 
hospital markets in large metropolitan areas is highly concentrated). 
 38. See Ginsburg, supra note 24, at 3. 
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together account for a large preponderance of hospital admissions in the 
area.39 The concentration of hospital markets has been increasing over 
time, with an ongoing wave of hospital mergers resulting in horizontal 
concentration, and hospital acquisitions of physician groups resulting in 
vertical integration.40 
The excessive concentration found in the provider market drives up 
prices to supracompetitive levels.41 Empirical studies have demonstrated 
that increasing concentration in hospital markets significantly raises hospital 
prices, by some estimates as much as twenty percent to forty percent.42 In 
concentrated markets, “must-have” hospitals have significantly more 
bargaining power than health insurers because the health plan needs the 
hospital to satisfy its individual and employer-customers and to provide 
sufficient access to necessary services.43 Hospitals with market power can 
resist health insurers’ pressures to constrain prices when they know the 
insurer cannot walk away from the negotiation.44 
Hospital markets are also characterized with dramatic variations in 
price. Within the same geographic area, there can be a sixty percent 
difference between the highest and lowest priced hospitals for the same 
inpatient services, and a twofold difference in prices for outpatient services.45 
Price variations in the hospital market are driven largely by differences in 
market share and cannot be explained by differences in the hospitals’ 
costs, quality, the sickness of the patients, or whether the hospital is an 
 
 39. See Cutler & Scott Morton, supra note 17, at 1966. 
 40. Id. (“The extent of hospital concentration has increased over time. The hospital HHI has 
increased by [forty percent] since the mid-1980s, changing from a market with on average [five] 
independent firms (there were [more than five] independent hospitals, but approximately [five] major 
ones) to a market with approximately [three] independent firms.”). 
 41. Martin Gaynor & Robert Town, Robert Wood Johnson Found., The Impact of Hospital 
ConsolidationUpdate 1 (2012), http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2012/ 
rwjf73261; Glenn A. Melnick, Yu-Chu Shen & Vivian Yaling Wu, The Increased Concentration of 
Health Plan Markets Can Benefit Consumers Through Lower Hospital Prices, 30 Health Aff. 1728, 
1731 (2011). 
 42. Gaynor & Town, supra note 41, at 2 (“The magnitude of price increases when hospitals 
merge in concentrated markets is typically quite large, most exceeding 20 percent.”); Martin Gaynor, 
Competition Policy in Health Care Markets: Navigating the Enforcement and Policy Maze, 33 Health 
Aff. 1088, 1089 (2014) (“Hospital mergers that create a dominant system can lead to very large price 
increases, even as high as 40–50 percent.”); Leemore S. Dafny, Estimation and Identification of Merger 
Effects: An Application to Hospital Mergers, 52 J.L. & Econ. 523, 544 (2009). 
 43. Chapin White, Amelia M. Bond & James D. Reschovsky, Ctr. For Studying Health Sys. 
Change, High and Varying Prices for Privately Insured Patients Underscore Hospital Market 
Power 2 (2013), http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/1375/1375.pdf; Robert A. Berenson et al., The 
Growing Power of Some Providers to Win Steep Payment Increases from Insurers Suggests Policy 
Remedies May Be Needed, 31 Health Aff. 973, 973 (2012). 
 44. See Robert A. Berenson et al., Unchecked Provider Clout in California Foreshadows 
Challenges to Health Reform, 29 Health Aff. 699, 702 (2010). 
 45. White et al., supra note 43, at 4. 
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academic medical center.46 In other words, when we pay more at a high-
price hospital, we are not getting more or better care. Rather, we are 
simply paying for the hospital’s monopoly rents.47 
Barriers to entry for new competitors exacerbate the problem of 
hospital market concentration. State certificate of need (“CON”) laws 
were originally designed to control supply of health care services in an 
effort to control spending.48 However, CON laws pose barriers to entry, 
making it difficult or impossible for new competitors to enter a market.49 
CON laws persist in more than two-thirds of states,50 but even in states 
without CON laws, state licensure, accreditation, and certification to 
participate in Medicare and Medicaid, make it difficult for competitors to 
enter the market.51 It is much easier for an existing hospital to buy up and 
merge with its competitors than it is to open a new hospital. 
The current landscape reveals a hospital market that is highly 
concentrated and trending toward more consolidation of market power 
among the large hospital systems. Although localities vary in their degree 
of concentration, in most of the United States, hospital markets are 
failing due to a lack of competition. 
C. Moral Hazard and Third Party Payment 
The uncertainty of illness or accident and the expense of acute 
medical care leads most people to finance their health care through third 
party insurance.52 The presence of the third party payer can lead to moral 
hazard, another feature of market failure, where individuals consume 
more health care than they would if they had to bear the full costs of 
health care.53 Even if an individual knows her excess use of health care 
 
 46. Massachusetts AG 2010 Report, supra note 10, at 2; Joseph P. Newhouse & Alan M. 
Garber, Geographic Variation in Health Care Spending in the United States: Insights from an Institute 
of Medicine Report, 310 JAMA 1227, 122728 (2013) (“[P]rice variation is responsible for an estimated 
70% of the total geographic variation in spending among privately insured persons. Variation in wage 
levels and variation in the quantity of services delivered are almost equally responsible for the 
remaining estimated 30% of spending variation.”). 
 47. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Profits Without Production, N.Y. Times (June 21, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/21/opinion/krugman-profits-without-production.html (defining monopoly 
rents as “profits that don’t represent returns on investment, but instead reflect the value of market 
dominance”). 
 48. Certificate of Need: State Health Laws and Programs, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/con-certificate-of-need-state-laws.aspx#Program (last visited Dec. 
18, 2015). 
 49. Gaynor, supra note 42, at 109091; William M. Sage, Getting the Product Right: How 
Competition Policy Can Improve Health Care Markets, 33 Health Aff. 1076, 1080 (2014). 
 50. Certificate of Need: State Health Laws and Programs, supra note 48 (identifying, as of 2011, 
thirty-six states with active CON law or program, twenty-eight of which regulate acute hospital beds). 
 51. See Greaney, supra note 13, at 865; Vladeck & Rice, supra note 13, at 1307. 
 52. See Arrow, supra note 28, at 945. 
 53. See Mark Pauly, Comment, The Economics of Moral Hazard, 58 Am. Econ. Rev. 531, 53335 
(1968). 
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services will result in increased health insurance premiums, the 
magnitude of her gain from the additional services is greater than the 
premium increase, which is spread across all policyholders.54 The tax 
subsidy that employers receive to provide health insurance for 
employees exacerbates this moral hazard by allowing more insurance to 
be purchased than would be with after-tax dollars.55 One correction to 
moral hazard is to impose price rationing at the point of service in the 
form of individual cost-sharing through copays, coinsurance, or 
deductibles.56 
In the case of hospital care, it is particularly difficult to strike the 
balance between the overconsumption from moral hazard and 
underconsumption of necessary care by those who cannot afford it. Most 
hospital stays are so expensive that even modest coinsurance rates can 
make hospital care unaffordable to most people, which may be one 
reason the Affordable Care Act places a limit on annual out-of-pocket 
expenses.57 Because hospital treatment is so expensive, it is likely to 
exceed an individual’s annual deductible and the statutory out-of-pocket 
limit, which protects the patient from financial risk, but makes her 
insensitive to hospital costs above the deductible.58 Health insurance may 
also exacerbate the market failure from hospital monopoliesby 
shielding individuals from prices, insurance allows monopolist hospitals 
to charge even more than the price that would be enabled by the 
monopoly.59 
Some have questioned the degree to which moral hazard produces 
inefficiency in health care.60 In the case of treatment for serious illness 
characteristic of acute hospital care, it is far from clear how much 
additional health care is consumed because of insurance coverage.61 
Almost no one would elect to undergo unnecessary major surgery simply 
 
 54. Id. at 534. 
 55. See Mark Pauly, Taxation, Health Insurance, and Market Failure in the Medical Economy, 
24 J. Econ. Lit. 629, 641 (1986). 
 56. See Joseph P. Newhouse & The Insurance Experiment Group, Free for All? Lessons from 
the RAND Health Insurance Experiment 4042 (1986); Pauly, supra note 53, at 534. 
 57. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1302(c), 42 U.S.C. § 18022(c)(2010); see also 
Allison K. Hoffman, Health Care Spending and Financial Security after the Affordable Care Act, 
92 N.C. L. Rev. 101, 121 (2014). 
 58. Ann Tynan et al., Ctr. For Studying Health Sys. Change, A Health Plan Work in 
Progress: Hospital-Physician Price and Quality Transparency 7 (2008); James C. Robinson & 
Kimberly MacPherson, Payers Test Reference Pricing and Centers of Excellence to Steer Patients to 
Low-Price and High-Quality Providers, 31 Health Aff. 2028, 2029 (2012). 
 59. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 17, at 863. 
 60. John A. Nyman, Is Moral Hazard Inefficient? The Policy Implications of a New Theory, 
23 Health Aff. 194, 196 (2004). 
 61. Id. Contrast this with the known waste and welfare loss that results from excess care that is 
ordered because of principal-agent problems, discussed infra in Part I.D. 
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because insurance covers it.62 Thus, cost-sharing strategies to control 
health care prices by targeting moral hazard may have reduced value or 
effect, especially for hospital services. Nevertheless, the existence of 
third-party financing does make individuals less sensitive to price 
differences among hospitals or providers, which dampens incentives for 
providers to compete on price. 
In sum, hospital prices are so high that we need insurance to finance 
even ordinary hospital services, but the presence of insurance creates 
moral hazard by shielding patients from the costs of their own care and 
making them insensitive to price signals. Consumers who are insensitive 
to price are less likely to impose market pressure on hospitals to 
constrain costs or prices. In this manner, moral hazard contributes to the 
market failure for health care services. However, as among the various 
health care market failures, moral hazard may be a less serious problem 
than others, such as provider monopolies, information asymmetry, or 
principal-agent problems. 
D. Principal-Agent Problems 
Hospital markets also suffer from principal-agent problems. Agency 
problems lead to inefficient economic results when the agent makes 
decisions on behalf of the principal, but the agent’s interests are misaligned 
with that of the principal.63 Tim Greaney described the “triple-agency” 
problem that arises between the patient, physician, and payer in many 
health care transactions.64 For hospital services, the hospital is yet 
another party, creating a quadruple-agency web of relations between the 
hospital, physician(s), patient, and payer. Worse, for most nonelderly 
patients in the United States, there is a quintuple-agency relationship, 
when you add the employer who purchases the insurance on behalf of 
the individual. 
The classic principal-agent relationship in health care is the 
physician-patient relationship.65 It is well-documented that physicians’ 
medical decisions on behalf of their patients are often influenced by 
financial incentives, practice habits, and norms that may be at odds with 
 
 62. Id. at 19798 (“[F]ew if any people would frivolously choose to endure coronary bypass 
surgery just because the price had dropped to zero. Therefore, imposing any coinsurance payment (let 
alone a 50 percent copayment) on the patient with coronary heart disease to limit . . . her purchases of 
bypass procedures simply does not make sense. Insurance contracts should be restructured so that this 
type of care is completely covered.”). 
 63. Paul A. Pautler & Michael G. Vita, Hospital Market Structure, Hospital Competition, and 
Consumer Welfare: What Can the Evidence Tell Us?, 10 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 117, 120 
(1994). 
 64. Thomas L. Greaney, Economic Regulation of Physicians: A Behavioral Economics 
Perspective, 53 St. Louis U. L.J. 1189, 1191 (2009). 
 65. Pautler & Vita, supra note 63, at 120; Vladeck & Rice, supra note 13, at 130607. 
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the patients’ interests in obtaining the appropriate care at the right price.66 
Physicians have legal and ethical obligations to put their patient’s interests 
first, but they have a difficult time ascertaining what the patient’s 
interests are.67 And even though cost is a significant concern to many 
patients, physicians generally do not know the price of the items and 
services they prescribe, so they cannot guide a patient to a cost-effective 
choice.68 
In the context of hospital services, the physician often stands 
between the patient and the hospital, being the one to order as well as 
perform the hospital service. Physicians drive demand for services, such 
that it is often quipped that the most expensive piece of equipment in the 
hospital is the doctor’s pen.69 The principal-agent problem between the 
physician and the patient is exacerbated by the incentives created by the 
way we pay for health care, which generally rewards ordering more 
services and more complex, highly paid services.70 Thus, the practical 
manifestation of the principal-agent problem in health care is a push 
toward overutilization of health care. 
The physician may be both the agent of the hospital (as an 
employee or contractor) and of the patient, with misaligned incentives 
existing between all three. For example, Medicare’s differing payment 
methodologies for hospitals (based on a lump sum payment) and 
physicians (based on fee-for-service) creates an inherent tension between 
providing less care or more care.71 Nevertheless, hospitals need 
physicians to maintain their business, both to perform services and to 
drive patient volume through referrals. To attract a physician’s “book of 
business,” hospitals bend over backwards to attract and curry favor with 
physicians, often competing for physician referrals more than they 
 
 66. See Greaney, supra note 64, at 11991200. 
 67. See E. Haavi Morreim, A Dose of Our Own Medicine: Alternative Medicine, Conventional 
Medicine, and the Standards of Science, 31 J.L. Med. & Ethics 222, 22225 (2003). 
 68. See Kanu Okike et al., Survey Finds that Few Orthopedic Surgeons Know the Cost of the 
Devices They Implant, 33 Health Aff. 103, 103 (2014). 
 69. See, e.g., Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, New Yorker, June 1, 2009, at 36, 43 (“Health-
care costs ultimately arise from the accumulation of individual decisions doctors make about which 
services and treatments to write an order for. The most expensive piece of medical equipment, as the 
saying goes, is a doctor’s pen.”). 
 70. See, e.g., Robert Murray, Maryland’s Bold Experiment in Reversing Fee-for-Service Incentives, 
Health Aff. Blog (Jan. 28, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/01/28/marylands-bold-experiment- 
in-reversing-fee-for-service-incentives/. 
 71. For inpatient care, Medicare pays hospitals a lump sum payment based on diagnosis under the 
Medicare Severity-Adjusted Diagnostic Related Group (“MS-DRG”), which puts financial pressure 
on the hospital to use fewer resources and discharge the patient sooner for a given admission. The 
physicians who perform the “professional component” of the hospital services are separately paid on a 
fee-for-service basis, which provides incentives to order more tests and services. See Fuse Brown, 
supra note 7, at 56; Greaney, supra note 16, at 15; Uwe E. Reinhardt, How Medicare Sets Hospital 
Prices: A Primer, N.Y. Times Economix (Nov. 26, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2010/11/26/how-medicare-sets-hospital-prices-a-primer/. 
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compete on price through generous compensation and upgrades in 
equipment and facilities.72 The patient’s interests and values are quickly 
lost in the complicated forces and powerful interests pushing care 
decisions.73 
Further complicating this web of agency relationships are the payers 
and employer-purchasers of health insurance. Just as the patient relies on 
the physician to make diagnostic and treatment decisions, the patient 
also relies on the third-party payer to negotiate prices with the provider 
and evaluate provider price and quality.74 The interests of the health 
insurance plan, attracting customers, and ensuring medical claims do not 
exceed premium revenue, often run against those of the patient-enrollee.75 
And for the majority of nonelderly Americans, the employer acts further 
as an agent by purchasing health insurance for employees. The employer 
has dampened incentives to bargain aggressively with providers because 
of the employer’s ability to pass on higher prices to employees in the 
form of reduced wages and higher premiums.76 Each agent has 
incomplete information about the patient’s preferences and has financial 
incentives that may be contrary to the interests of the patient. 
The quadruple or quintuple-agency problem creates barriers to 
efficient purchasing and selling of hospital services. It is nearly 
impossible for the patient’s interests to be served effectively when 
hospitals view physicians and payers, not patients, as their primary 
 
 72. United States v. Rockford Mem’l Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1283 (N.D. Ill. 1989) 
(“Traditionally, hospitals competed on the basis of their attractiveness to physicians. Hospitals 
recognized that, in most cases, physicians controlled inpatient admissions to hospitals. Consequently, 
attracting competent physicians became a means to maintain and expand inpatient admissions.”), 
aff’d, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market 
Failures, Total Welfare, and the Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 849, 
86465 (2000). 
 73. See, e.g., Albert G. Mulley et al., Stop the Silent Misdiagnosis: Patients’ Preferences Matter, 
345 BMJ 6572 (2012) (describing the problem of misdiagnosis of patient preferences and values in 
treatment, which leads to excess provision of unwanted treatment). 
 74. See Paul B. Ginsburg, Shopping for Price in Medical Care, 26 Health Aff. w208, w209 (2007); 
Reinhardt, supra note 8, at 61. 
 75. See C. Paul Wazzan et al., An Economic Analysis of the Impact of Pay-for-Performance 
Initiatives on Physicians, Patients and Insurance Providers, 3 Ind. Health L. Rev. 357, 358 (2006). 
 76. Gaynor, supra note 42, at 1089 (“[P]rice increases by hospitals are fully passed through to 
consumers. When prices go up, health insurance premiums go up. When premiums go up, employers 
simply reduce workers’ total compensation dollar for dollar by the amount of the premium increase. 
This can come in the form of lower pay; increased cost-sharing for premiums; or lower benefits, 
including dropping coverage entirely in some cases.”); Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Culprit Behind High 
U.S. Health Care Prices, N.Y. Times: Economix (June 7, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://economix.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2013/06/07/the-culprit-behind-high-u-s-health-care-prices/ (“One reason for the 
employers’ passivity in paying health care bills may be that they know, or should know, that the fringe 
benefits they purchase for their employees ultimately come out of the employees’ total pay package. 
In a sense, employers behave like pickpockets who take from their employees’ wallets and with the 
money lifted purchase goodies for their employees.”). 
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customers, because physicians and payers drive demand for their services.77 
Hospitals then make pricing and economic decisions to maximize 
bargaining leverage over health plans.78 As a result, information about 
price and product are communicated in a way that is impenetrable to the 
patient, spoken in the disaggregated and incomprehensible language of 
CPT codes,79 DRGs,80 case rates, per diems, facility fees, and professional 
components.81 For every hospital interaction, the patient may be 
represented simultaneously and imperfectly by multiple physicians, the 
health insurer, and employer, and the patient’s interests quickly get lost 
in the complicated web of quadruple or quintuple-agency relationships. 
The principal-agent problems in health care are interrelated with 
both moral hazard and information asymmetry. A person may consume 
more health care than he would if he were bearing the full cost of the 
services because the decision to order the services is made by an agent 
(the physician). Moreover, there is substantial information asymmetry 
between the principals and agents in health care. An easy example is that 
the physician might happen to know that an alternative item or service 
might be similarly effective, but does not tell the patient that the 
physician has a greater financial incentive to recommend one choice over 
another. These types of market failures are best thought of as conceptual 
overlapping categories rather than as crisply defined phenomena. 
However, it remains useful to think about principal-agent problems in 
health care as its own category, because the policy interventions to 
address them may be different than those that address moral hazard or 
imperfect information. 
 
 77. Peter J. Hammer, Questioning Traditional Antitrust Presumptions: Price and Non-Price 
Competition in Hospital Markets, 32 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 727, 734 (1999) (describing hospital 
competition for loyalty of physicians for referrals or payers for volume of patients, because both 
physicians and payers are sources of demand for hospital services). 
 78. See Anderson, supra note 11, at 78485 (describing hospitals’ incentives to inflate charges, 
including to improve negotiating power against health plans); Berenson et al., supra note 43, at 976. 
 79. CPT codes, or Current Procedural Terminology, are “the most widely accepted medical 
nomenclature used to report medical procedures and services under public and private health 
insurance programs.” About CPT®, Am. Med. Ass’n, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-
resources/solutions-managing-your-practice/coding-billing-insurance/cpt/about-cpt.page? (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2015).  
 80. DRGs, or Diagnosis-Related Groups, refers to a payment classification system that groups 
similar clinical conditions by diagnosis and includes all procedures furnished by the hospital during the 
inpatient stay. Hospitals are paid a fixed rate for all inpatient services according to the DRG assigned 
to the patient, adjusted for severity and comorbid conditions. See Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Acute Care Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment System 
(2013), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/ 
downloads/AcutePaymtSysfctsht.pdf.  
 81. See Sage, supra note 49, at 107778. 
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E. Externalities of Irrational Hospital Prices 
Elsewhere I have written about the externalities of our current 
hospital pricing system: the harms imposed on individuals who face 
unaffordable and incomprehensible hospital bills.82 Though hospitals may 
believe they internalize the costs of uncompensated care by shifting these 
costs to other payers, there are many costs externalized by the hospital to 
individual patients and society as a whole. The externalities of excessive 
hospital prices and harsh debt collection practices include the costs of 
personal bankruptcy, home foreclosure, wages garnished, legal fees and 
interest paid, loss of creditworthiness, and self-rationing of necessary 
items like food, shelter, or medical care.83 
Hospital bills are often unaffordably high, especially for the 
uninsured or underinsured individual.84 When a person cannot pay his or 
her hospital bill, the hospital typically uses aggressive debt collection 
practices to pursue the debt, including reporting the debt to credit 
agencies, seeking garnishment of wages, placing a lien on or seeking 
foreclosure on the patient’s home, or assigning the debt to collection 
agencies that use harsh tactics to hound a person to pay the debt.85 Even 
if the hospital ultimately only collects a small fraction of the debt, the 
patients suffer significant financial and health-related costs from having 
an unpaid hospital debt.86 The externalities of irrational hospital prices 
affect a broad range of patients and are not just a problem for the 
uninsured.87 In a 2012 survey, forty-one percent of adults aged nineteen 
to sixty-four reported they had trouble paying off medical debt, and of 
 
 82. See Fuse Brown, supra note 7, at 40. 
 83. See Jacoby & Warren, supra note 12, at 548 (estimating that about forty-six percent of 
personal bankruptcy filers had self-identified a medical reason for their bankruptcy); Melissa B. 
Jacoby, The Debtor-Patient: In Search of Non-Debt-Based Alternatives, 69 Brook. L. Rev. 453, 477 
(2004); Melissa B. Jacoby & Mirya Holman, Managing Medical Bills on the Brink of Bankruptcy, 10 
Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 239, 247 (2010); Katherine Porter, The Damage of Debt, 69 Wash. 
& Lee L. Rev. 979, 100608 (2012); Robertson et al., supra note 12, at 6668 (concluding from survey 
data that forty-nine percent of home foreclosures were caused in part by a medical problem, and 
twenty-three percent were caused by unmanageable medical bills). 
 84. See Reinhardt, supra note 8, at 62. 
 85. See, e.g., Marsha Austin, Uninsured Pay Higher Price: Hospital Collection Agents Demand 
Full Cost of Care, Den. Post, Jan. 28, 2003, at 1A (noting that hospitals in the Denver area have sued 
at least 210 individuals for unpaid bills); Cullen Browder, Wake Woman May Lose Home to Cover 
Late Husband’s Medical Bills, WRAL.com (July 12, 2004), http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/ 
112201/; Liz Kowalczyk, Hospital Using Liens to Collect from Patients, Boston Globe, Oct. 17, 2004, at 
A1; Lucette Lagnado, Twenty Years and Still PayingJeanette White Is Long Dead but Her Hospital 
Bill Lives On, Wall St. J., Mar. 13, 2003, at B1; Elisabeth Rosenthal, When Health Costs Harm Your 
Credit, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 2014, at SR.4. 
 86. Hospitals typically only recover about ten percent of the bill from self-pay patients. See A 
RelayHealth White Paper: Improving Self Pay at All Points of Service, RelayHealth 8 (2010), http:// 
ndha.org/image/cache/ImprovingSelf-PayAtAllPointsofService_RelayHealth__2_.pdf; Anderson, supra 
note 11, at 787. 
 87. See Fuse Brown, supra note 7, at 4151. 
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those reporting difficulty with medical debt, forty-two percent (or 
approximately thirty-two million people) reported lower credit ratings as 
a result.88 
Health care markets are replete with forms of market failure. Like a 
textbook example, the U.S. hospital market exhibits the types of 
information asymmetries, market concentration, moral hazard, principal-
agent problems, and externalities that interfere with a market’s efficient 
and effective functioning. 
II.  Policy Solutions Evaluated Against Market Failures 
The type of market failure and magnitude seen in the health care 
market invites a regulatory solution. This Part describes the variety of 
legal and policy solutions generally put forth to discipline health care 
prices: (1) market solutions, including transparency and other efforts to 
heighten the consumer behavior of patients to discipline prices through 
competition; (2) antitrust enforcement to protect competition in the 
hospital market; (3) payment and delivery reforms, such as accountable 
care organizations or bundled payments that aim to control health care 
costs through improved care coordination and aligned provider financial 
incentives; (4) consumer protection solutions where courts use tools from 
contract law or consumer protection statutes to protect vulnerable 
patients from the extremes of hospital pricing; and (5) rate regulation in 
the form of all-payer rate setting, price caps, or global budgets. 
Part II uses an analytic framework to evaluate each policy approach 
to controlling health care prices by measuring the policy for its 
effectiveness at addressing the various market failures identified in 
Part I. This policy solution-against-market-failure approach reveals much 
about the strengths, weaknesses, and blind spots of each proposed 
solution and allows policymakers to select the policy approaches that will 
have the best chance of controlling health care prices, and therefore, 
health care spending. A depiction of this analytic framework and its 
conclusions is set forth in Figure 1.89 
A. Market Solutions 
Market solutions are the most popular solutions among health 
policymakers to address the problem of excess and wildly variable health 
care prices.90 Market solutions include price transparency, consumer-
 
 88. Sara Collins et al., Commonwealth Fund, Insuring the Future: Current Trends in Health 
Coverage and the Effects of Implementing the Affordable Care Act xii (2013), http://www. 
commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2013/Apr/1681_Collins_insuring_
future_biennial_survey_2012_FINAL.pdf. 
 89. See supra Figure 1. 
 90. Meredith Rosenthal & Norman Daniels, Beyond Competition: The Normative Implications of 
Consumer-Driven Health Plans, 31 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 671, 671 (2006). 
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directed health care, reference pricing, and tiered or narrow networks, and 
they rely on competition and market forces to reduce price variations and 
to scale prices to reflect value. 
1. Price Transparency 
Price transparency promotes the notion that health care purchasers, 
whether individuals or employers, ought to be able to find and compare 
the price of a given service between hospitals. Price transparency has 
broad political and intuitive appeal by attempting to lift the veil of 
secrecy that shrouds hospital prices.91 So the argument goes, consumers 
need access to accurate, understandable, and comparable information 
regarding hospital price and quality for market forces to discipline prices 
and improve quality.92 Armed with such information, consumers will 
shop for health care and select the lower cost, higher quality providers 
and pressure the others to bring their prices and quality levels in line.93 
Health care price transparency initiatives are being pursued at both 
the state and federal levels. A majority of states have passed some form 
of legislation to improve hospital price transparency.94 According to 2014 
data from the Catalyst for Payment Reform, thirty-five states only 
require that hospitals post or make available their chargemaster data;95 
fifteen states require the reporting of the prices hospitals receive from 
private payers, whether actual claims data or average amounts paid 
(several of which also require reporting of chargemaster data);96 and two 
states (New Hampshire and Massachusetts) make available more 
detailed, plan-specific price information.97 At the federal level, the 
Department of Health and Human Services initiated its price transparency 
efforts by releasing hospital charge data on May 8, 2013, updated annually, 
 
 91. Cutler & Dafny, supra note 15, at 894. 
 92. Steinmetz & Emanuel, supra note 15, at 433. 
 93. Sinaiko & Rosenthal, supra note 15, at 892. 
 94. Catalyst for Payment Reform & Health Care Incentives Improvement Inst., Report Card 
on State Price Transparency Laws 9–16 (2014), http://www.hci3.org/sites/default/files/files/Report_ 
PriceTransLaws_2014.pdf; see also Sinaiko & Rosenthal, supra note 15, at 891. 
 95. Catalyst for Payment Reform, supra note 94, at 9–16. These states include: Arizona, 
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New 
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. 
 96. Id. These states include Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, 
Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and 
West Virginia. 
 97. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6A, § 16K (2012); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111, § 228 (2014); N.H. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 420-G:11, 420-G:11-a (2006). 
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and making available $87 million in grants to states to create data centers 
to collect and analyze health care pricing information for consumers.98 
For transparency efforts, the type of data matters. Publishing 
chargemaster prices does little to accomplish price transparency.99 
Chargemasters are too long and incomprehensible to be useful and do 
not reflect the prices that the majority of individuals with insurance 
would pay.100 Average prices negotiated by payers gives a better sense of 
the relative price differences between hospitals actually paid by health 
plans in the aggregate, but it does not give an individual a sense of how 
much she might pay with her particular health plan or the range in prices 
negotiated by different health plans. Plan-specific data or estimates of a 
patient’s expected out-of-pocket costs are more helpful for consumers to 
get a sense of what their actual costs might be, but still may fall short if 
not accompanied by robust quality data, which is much more difficult to 
measure.101 Most consumers do not want cheaper health care if it is of 
poorer quality, and without good quality data, patients often assume 
(incorrectly) that price is a proxy for quality.102 
It is far from clear whether consumers will use available price and 
quality data information to make their treatment choices. Generally, the 
more complex the information, the less consumers utilize it. For 
example, price information ought to be provided about the whole bundle 
of services associated with an episode of care rather than a disaggregated 
list of coded, a la carte items, as hospital services are often priced.103 
Earlier efforts at health plan price transparency using easy-to-read 
symbols ($ vs. $$$) were abandoned due to little consumer use and 
pressure from low-price providers to increase prices.104 If the patient is 
shielded from price differences because she has exceeded her deductible, 
 
 98. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Administration Offers Consumers 
Unprecedented Look at Hospital Charges (May 8, 2013), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/ 
MediaReleaseDatabase/Press-releases/2013-Press-releases-items/2013-05-08.html?DLPage=3&DLEntries= 
10&DLSort=0&DLSortDir=ascending; Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Fact 
Sheet: HHS Releases Hospital Data on Charge Variation to Promote Transparency (May 8, 2013), 
http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-Sheets/2013-Fact-Sheets-Items/2013-05-
08.html. 
 99. See Anderson, supra note 11, at 786. A chargemaster is a master list of the hospital’s 
undiscounted or full charges, akin to retail list prices, for each of the tens of thousands of items, 
services, and procedures it provides. Allen Dobson et al., Lewin Group, A Study of Hospital 
Charge Setting Practices 1 (2005). 
 100. David Dranove, The Rest of the Story About Hospital Pricing, Health Care Blog (May 9, 2013), 
http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2013/05/09/the-rest-of-the-story-about-hospital-pricing/#more-61521; Muir 
et al., supra note 15, at 32629. 
 101. See Anderson, supra note 11, at 786. 
 102. See Sinaiko & Rosenthal, supra note 15, at 892. 
 103. See Ginsburg, supra note 74, at w211. 
 104. Id. at w213. 
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then she has little incentive to choose a hospital based on price 
information. 
Price transparency, though politically popular, has a couple of major 
pitfalls. First, disclosure of prices does not solve the market failures 
created by noncompetitive hospital markets. Despite having among the 
most robust price transparency laws in the country, New Hampshire has 
not seen a measurable reduction in hospital prices or price variation.105 
There, price transparency has not been able to overcome the tidal force 
of a noncompetitive hospital market.106 Where hospitals do not compete 
on price, transparency does little to constrain prices. Large, “must-have” 
hospitals can still command high prices without losing patient volume 
where patients and payers have few alternatives. 
The second pitfall is that widespread price transparency may lead 
paradoxically to higher rather than lower hospital prices.107 In particular, 
revelation of the prices that commercial health plans actually pay 
hospitalsthe data most helpful for patientscould create a perverse 
incentive for hospitals to raise their prices.108 To illustrate, imagine 
Hospital A offers a significant discount to Insurer 1 and a smaller 
discount to Insurer 2. If forced to reveal its prices, Hospital A might be 
unwilling to offer the deeper discount to Insurer 1, knowing that 
Insurer 2 will likely pressure it to offer the same discount.109 This 
tendency is exacerbated where the hospitals have greater bargaining 
power than the health plans, which is true in most provider markets.110 In 
these markets, a lower-priced Hospital B may raise its prices once it sees 
what Hospital A is charging because the health plans lack the power to 
keep Hospital B’s prices in check.111 Especially in less competitive 
markets, price transparency might create a magnetic ceiling, where all 
hospitals converge on higher prices rather than compete to lower them.112 
Hence, prices might become more uniform, but uniformly higher. 
 
 105. Ha T. Tu & Johanna R. Lauer, Ctr. for Studying Health Sys. Change, Impact of Health 
Care Price Transparency on Price Variation: The New Hampshire Experience 1 (2009). 
 106. Id. at 2. 
 107. Cutler & Dafny, supra note 15, at 894. 
 108. See Ginsburg, supra note 74, at w214 (citing a Danish study of the pricing behavior of 
concrete producers in a concentrated market. Following implementation price transparency policies, 
the companies raised prices fifteen to twenty percent because of the loss of the ability to offer secret 
discounts to buyers). 
 109. See id.; Margaret K. Kyle & David B. Ridley, Would Greater Transparency And Uniformity 
Of Health Care Prices Benefit Poor Patients?, 26 Health Aff. 1384, 1388 (2007). 
 110. Cutler & Dafny, supra note 15, at 894. 
 111. Sinaiko & Rosenthal, supra note 15, at 893. 
 112. Cutler & Dafny, supra note 15, at 894; Kyle & Ridley, supra note 109, at 1388. 
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2. Consumer-Directed Health Care 
Consumer-directed health care (“CDHC”) is another market-based 
approach that builds off of price transparency. The typical mechanism to 
encourage CDHC is through a high deductible health plan coupled with 
a tax-advantaged health savings account (“HSA”).113 By giving patients 
some “skin in the game,” CDHC sensitizes patients to health care costs, 
which leads the patient to exert market pressure on providers to move 
toward more uniform prices.114 CDHC attempts to address the moral 
hazard problem of health insurance by forcing the insured individual to 
bear the initial cost of her health care expenditure, which will cause her 
to ration her utilization of services.115 
In 2015, a plan is considered a high deductible plan if the deductible 
is at least $1300 for an individual and $2600 for a family.116 Deductibles 
vary widely, and over a third of family deductibles exceed $5000.117 The 
use of high deductible plans is widespread and steadily increasing. In a 
2014 survey of large employers, eighty-one percent reported offering a 
CHDC plan to employees as an option, and thirty-two percent reported 
offering a CDHC plan as the only option, up from twenty-five percent 
the previous year.118 As of 2014, twenty percent of covered employees 
were enrolled in a CDHC plan, compared with just four percent in 
2006.119 On the health insurance exchanges, high deductible health plans 
comprise approximately sixty percent to eighty percent of plans.120 
In the form of high deductible health plans, CDHC has a limited 
impact on hospital prices because most hospital services will be so 
expensive that a patient will “blow through” her deductible, and thus be 
insensitive to price variations above the deductible.121 Carl Schneider and 
Mark Hall identified several barriers to the goals of CDHC that prevent 
patients from engaging in consumer behaviors.122 Patients may lack 
 
 113. See N.J. Dep’t of Health, supra note 27, at 99. 
 114. Gail R. Wilensky, Consumer-Driven Health Plans: Early Evidence and Potential Impact on 
Hospitals, 25 Health Aff. 174, 18384 (2006). 
 115. See Rosenthal & Daniels, supra note 90, at 672; Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Is Health Insurance a 
Bad Idea? The Consumer-Driven Perspective, 14 Conn. Ins. L.J. 377, 37879 (2008). 
 116. Rev. Proc. 2014-30, 2014-20 I.R.B. 1009. 
 117. Gary Claxton et al., Kaiser Family Found., Employer Health Benefits: 2014 Annual 
Survey 158, Exhibit 8.11 (2014), http://kff.org/health-costs/report/2014-employer-health-benefits-
survey/. 
 118. Press Release, Nat’l Bus. Grp. on Health, U.S. Employers Changing Health Benefit Plans to 
Control Rising Costs, Comply with ACA, National Business Group on Health Survey Finds (Aug. 13, 
2014), http://www.businessgrouphealth.org/pressroom/pressRelease.cfm?ID=234. 
 119. Claxton et al., supra note 117, at 154, Exhibit 8.5. 
 120. Bob Herman, High-Deductible Plans Dominate Next Open Enrollment, Modern Healthcare 
(Nov. 30, 2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20141113/NEWS/311139966. 
 121. See Tynan et al., supra note 58, at 4; Gail R. Wilensky, Consumer-Driven Health Plans: Early 
Evidence and Potential Impact on Hospitals, 25 Health Aff. 174, 182 (2006). 
 122. Schneider & Hall, supra note 18, at 15. 
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choices among plans and providers.123 Moreover, despite efforts to 
promote transparency, patients still lack necessary information about 
price and quality.124 If they lack quality data, patients are likely to opt for 
the higher-priced hospitals because of the mistaken perception that price 
is a proxy for quality.125 Even with price information, patients are often 
unable to bargain with the hospital, either because they will not or 
cannot. Patients place themselves in their doctor’s hands, following 
whatever advice the doctor prescribes, including at which hospital to 
have a procedure performed.126 Acutely sick patients are in a particularly 
vulnerable position, unable to negotiate on prices for urgently needed 
care on the way to the emergency room or at the bedside of a gravely ill 
family member.127 Empirical research has cast doubt on patients’ financial 
literacy and ability to process the complex information necessary to 
make health care choices.128 
Studies have demonstrated that higher cost-sharing has a 
disproportionate, negative impact on the poor and those with chronic 
illness, highlighting questions of distributive justice.129 Greater cost-
sharing causes people to cut back not just on unnecessary care, but 
needed care as well.130 Privately insured individuals with incomes below 
200 percent of poverty are significantly more likely to have deductibles 
that exceed five percent of their incomes and are more likely to delay 
needed care as a result.131 When individuals defer cost-saving preventive 
and outpatient care, they may later consume more expensive ER and 
hospital services for poorly controlled illness.132 CDHC may contribute to 
adverse selection, with healthier (and, evidence shows, wealthier and 
more educated) individuals selecting a CDHC plan and sicker people 
 
 123. Id. at 18. 
 124. Id. at 2021. 
 125. Sinaiko & Rosenthal, supra note 15, at 892. 
 126. Schneider & Hall, supra note 18, at 27. 
 127. Hall & Schneider, supra note 18, at 658. 
 128. Ginsburg, supra note 74, at w211; Greaney, supra note 64, at 11991200; Schneider & Hall, 
supra note 18, at 3840. 
 129. See, e.g., Vicki Fung et al., Financial Barriers to Care Among Low-Income Children with 
Asthma: Health Care Reform Implications, 168 JAMA Pediatrics 649, 650 (2014); Rosenthal & 
Daniels, supra note 90, at 675, 679; Amal Trivedi et al., Increased Ambulatory Care Copayments and 
Hospitalizations Among the Elderly, 362 N. Eng. J. Med. 320, 320 (2010). Policies can selectively 
address the problem of the negative impact of cost-sharing on low-income populations. For example, 
the Affordable Care Act subsidizes cost-sharing for low-income individuals purchasing plans on the 
exchanges, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18071 (2010), and requires certain preventive care to be covered without 
cost-sharing, 42 U.S.C.A § 300gg-13 (2011). 
 130. See Newhouse & The Insurance Experiment Group, supra note 56, at 162. 
 131. Sara R. Collins et al., Commonwealth Fund, Too High a Price: Out-of-Pocket Health Care 
Costs in the United States 45 (2014), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications
/issue-brief/2014/nov/1784_collins_too_high_a_price_out_of_pocket_tb_v2.pdf. 
 132. See Fung, supra note 129, at 652; Trivedi, supra note 129, at 321. 
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opting for plans with lower deductibles.133 Meredith Rosenthal and 
Norman Daniels explain that among employer-sponsored high-deductible 
health plans with HSAs, the employer contribution to the HSA tends to 
redistribute wealth from the unhealthy to the healthy.134 
3. Reference Pricing 
Like high deductibles, reference pricing also puts the individual’s 
own dollars at stake, but reverses who pays the first dollar of coverage.135 
Instead of making the patient pay for the first few thousand dollars of 
care, health plans agree to pay the price for a given service charged by a 
low priced provider, and the individual is free to seek care from a range 
of other providers but is responsible for the difference between that 
provider’s higher price and the reference price.136 Health economist 
Austin Frakt illustrates the difference between deductibles and reference 
pricing by analogizing deductibles to being told that insurance will pay 
for any Toyota you want if you pay the first $500.137 You would likely 
pick the most expensive car, such as an $80,000 Land Cruiser. With 
reference pricing, you are told that insurance will cover the first $15,000 
of any Toyota, but you have to pay the excess price.138 In this example, 
reference pricing will clearly lead to more value and price-sensitive 
shopping by the consumer who may opt for a Toyota Yaris instead of a 
Land Cruiser. 
Proponents say reference pricing makes patients more sensitive to 
the differences in price between hospitals than CDHC, where most 
hospital visits will exceed the patient’s deductible.139 The increased price 
sensitivity from reference pricing creates market pressure for high-priced 
providers to lower their prices closer to the reference price or else lose 
business. One advantage of reference pricing over CDHC is that it relies 
on the health plan to gather and report the providers’ price information 
 
 133. See Jost, supra note 115, at 385; Rosenthal & Daniels, supra note 90, at 679. 
 134. See Rosenthal & Daniels, supra note 90, at 678. 
[I]n contrast to traditional insurance plans, when employers contribute to savings accounts 
in CDHPs, they are distributing some portion of the healthcare benefit directly to all 
enrollees (the account), not just those needing care. These account dollars may exceed 
annual health care spending for healthier workers, while they will quickly be expended by 
those who are chronically ill. As many have noted, unless savings from CDHPs are realized 
and redistributed, or other subsidies are given to those who are less healthy, there is an 
inevitable redistribution in favor of the healthy. 
Id. 
 135. See Robinson & MacPherson, supra note 58, at 2029. 
 136. Reinhardt, supra note 76. 
 137. Austin Frakt, Is Reference Pricing a Good Deal?, AcademyHealth Blog (May 23, 2013), 
http://blog.academyhealth.org/is-reference-pricing-a-good-deal/. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Editorial, The Weird World of Colonoscopy Costs, N.Y. Times (June 9, 2013), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2013/06/09/opinion/sunday/the-weird-world-of-colonoscopy-costs.html. 
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rather than the individual, who may not have sufficient data or 
wherewithal to evaluate the different options.140 Health insurers favor 
reference pricing because it caps their financial responsibility for a 
particular service.141 
There is early evidence that reference pricing can nudge patients 
toward more cost-effective choices and cause high-priced providers to 
lower prices closer to reference price levels.142 Payers are starting to use 
reference pricing for hospital or outpatient services, but generally only 
for certain standardized procedures where there is wide price variation 
but little variation in quality, such as colonoscopy or hip replacement.143 
In addition, the service ought to be “shoppable,” that is, a nonurgent 
service that allows the patient time to shop around, with readily available 
information regarding price and quality, and for which there are several 
choices of provider.144 
Reference pricing also has limitations. Most health care spending is 
for services that are not shoppable and are therefore ill-suited for 
reference pricing.145 To make up profits that it loses on reference-priced 
services, hospitals may simply raise prices for non-reference priced 
services.146 One study suggests reference pricing may have a limited 
impact on total spending because it tends to affect prices only at the 
highest end of the price distribution.147 Some of the barriers to CDHC, 
such as lack of choices, lack of available data, reliance on physician 
recommendations, and impaired ability to make choices based on 
information given, could similarly afflict reference pricing initiatives. 
 
 140. See Ginsburg, supra note 74, at w211. 
 141. Frakt, supra note 137. 
 142. Paul Fronstin & M. Christopher Roebuck, Emp. Benefit Research Inst., Reference 
Pricing for Health Care Services: A New Twist on the Defined Contribution Concept in 
Employment-Based Health Benefits 5 (2014); see also Sarah Thomson et al., Value-Based Cost 
Sharing in the United States and Elsewhere Can Increase Patients’ Use of High-Value Goods and 
Services, 32 Health Aff. 704, 706 (2013) (showing that reference pricing lead consumers to switch 
from higher priced brand-name prescriptions to lower priced generics without adverse health impacts). 
For a discussion of the effects of reference pricing used by CalPERS, which covers California’s public 
retirees, see James C. Robinson & Timothy T. Brown, Increases in Consumer Cost Sharing Redirect 
Patient Volumes and Reduce Hospital Prices for Orthopedic Surgery, 32 Health Aff. 1392, 139397 
(2013) (showing how reference pricing initiative for hip and knee replacements led to a 21.2% increase 
in CalPERS patients at low-priced hospitals and a 34.4% decrease at high-priced hospitals, leading 
many high-priced hospitals reduced their prices for the procedures for CalPERS in response). 
 143. See Robinson & MacPherson, supra note 58, at 203435; Fronstin & Roebuck, supra note 142, 
at 4 (“In 2012, 11 percent of employers with 500 or more workers were using some type of [reference 
pricing], and another 16 percent were considering it.”). 
 144. See Chapin White & Megan Eguchi, Nat’l Inst. for Health Care Reform, Reference 
Pricing: A Small Piece of the Health Care Prices and Quality Puzzle 2 (2014); Ginsburg, supra 
note 74, at w210. 
 145. White & Eguchi, supra note 144, at 4 (“Using an inclusive definition, all shoppable services 
accounted for about a third of total spending if both inpatient and ambulatory services are included.”). 
 146. Fronstin & Roebuck, supra note 142, at 5. 
 147. White & Eguchi, supra note 144, at 1. 
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Reference pricing comes with a thorny technical problem of how to set 
the reference price. Set too high, and the cost-savings will be lost, with 
lower-priced providers raising their prices up to the reference price.148 Set 
too low, and the providers may not be able to cover the cost of providing 
the service, leading providers to drop the service, to cost-shift to more 
remunerative services, or to seek market power as a method of resisting 
reference pricing.149 
4. Tiering and Narrow Networks 
Another market approach relies upon health insurance plans to engage 
in active purchasing in the form of narrow or tiered networks to pressure 
hospitals and other providers to restrain prices.150 In a narrow network, 
payers selectively contract with a limited group of providers who will 
agree to lower prices in exchange for patient volume.151 Under a tiering 
strategy, the health plan sorts contracted providers or service lines into 
tiers based on price and steers patients to the lower priced providers (the 
preferred tier) using lower cost-sharing incentives.152 In their roles 
curating the narrow or tiered network, the health plan is the one wielding 
the consumer power on behalf of the patient. 
Neither approach is new. Narrow networks and tiering were both 
strategies widespread during the rise of managed care and HMOs in the 
1980s and 1990s.153 Consumers and employers vociferously resisted 
choice-limiting networks then, and it is unclear whether they will accept 
similarly narrowed choices today.154 Nevertheless, tiering and narrow 
networks are gaining renewed attention as solutions to discipline health 
care prices.155 The ACA has accelerated the revival of narrow networks 
because of its limits on health plans’ ability to engage in underwriting or 
to narrow benefits to keep premiums down.156 Thus, one of the remaining 
 
 148. Id. at 9. 
 149. Id. at 10. 
 150. Chapin White et al., Understanding Differences Between High- and Low-Price Hospitals: 
Implications for Efforts to Rein in Costs, 33 Health Aff. 324, 330 (2014). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Paul B. Ginsburg & L. Gregory Pawlson, Seeking Lower Prices Where Providers Are 
Consolidated: An Examination of Market and Policy Strategies, 33 Health Aff. 1067, 1069 (2014). 
 153. Robert A. Berenson et al., supra note 44, at 975. 
 154. Muir et al., supra note 100, at 339. 
 155. See, e.g., Cutler & Scott Morton, supra note 17, at 1969; Ginsburg & Pawlson, supra note 152, 
at 1069; White et al., supra note 150, at 330. 
 156. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2010) (establishing limits on health plan underwriting on the basis of 
health status); 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2010) (establishing requirements for health plans to cover the 
essential health benefits). 
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strategies for health plans to keep their prices in check is to offer narrow 
networks of providers.157 
Narrow networks and tiering strategies rely upon the existence of 
sufficient competition among hospitals, which is lacking in many 
markets.158 Without competition, powerful providers use their market 
power to require anti-tiering provisions in their contracts with health 
plans, or else require that the plan always include the high-priced hospital 
in the most preferred tier.159 To address this issue, Massachusetts passed a 
law in 2010 prohibiting providers from using anti-tiering provisions in 
their plan contracts.160 Even with such a law, health plans may have no 
choice but to include high priced hospitals in their network or in the best 
tier because they have unique services, such as a Level I trauma facility 
or a Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (“NICU”), that lower priced hospitals 
lack.161 In most places, health plans will be unable to exclude “must-
have” providers from the highest tier due to their market power.162 
5. Market Approaches Measured Against Health Care Market 
Failures 
Market solutions to the hospital pricing problem are intuitively 
pleasingthey attempt to restore market forces to a failed market. Price 
transparency and reference pricing take aim at correcting information 
asymmetry and helping patients become informed consumers. It may be 
technically difficult to implement price transparency or reference pricing, 
but it is plausible that well-designed programs can prompt effective 
comparison shopping by patients.163 The cost-sharing imposed on 
individuals by CDHC, especially in the form of reference pricing, attempts 
to address moral hazard and sensitizes patients to the prices of their care. 
The biggest problem with market approaches to discipline hospital 
prices is that they fundamentally will not work in concentrated markets 
where there is little choice or competition between providers.164 And as 
 
 157. See David Cusano & Amy Thomas, Narrow Networks Under the ACA: Financial Drivers and 
Implementation Strategies, Health Aff. Blog (Feb. 17, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/02/17/ 
narrow-networks-under-the-aca-financial-drivers-and-implementation-strategies/. 
 158. See supra Part I.B. 
 159. Ginsburg & Pawlson, supra note 152, at 1070. 
 160. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 1760, § 9A (West 2012). 
 161. White et al., supra note 150, at 330. 
 162. Robert Berenson, Acknowledging the Elephant: Moving Market Power and Prices to the 
Center of Health Policy, Health Aff. Blog (June 3, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/06/03/ 
acknowledging-the-elephant-moving-market-power-and-prices-to-the-center-of-health-policy/. 
 163. See, e.g., Sze-jung Wu et al., Price Transparency for MRIs Increased Use of Less Costly 
Providers and Triggered Provider Competition, 33 Health Aff. 1391, 139495 (2014). 
 164. Vladeck, supra note 13, at 1085 (“If sellers have too much market power, in other words, a 
policy that supports a shift in the buying function from insurers with some market power to consumers 
with effectively none is not likely to succeed in imposing discipline on producers from the demand 
side.”). 
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discussed above, concentrated hospital markets are the norm, not the 
exception.165 Where there is no choice, patients cannot shop around or 
substitute the lower cost or higher value provider. Where hospital-sellers 
have disproportionate market power, purchasers (health plans or patients) 
can exert little discipline on prices through transparency, CDHC, 
reference pricing, or active purchasing. 
Moreover, the stressful nature of most hospital encounters makes it 
unlikely for transparency plus CDHC to overcome patients’ substantial 
cognitive and behavioral barriers to rational consumer behavior.166 Even 
when equipped with sufficient price and quality information, when it 
comes to serious medical decisions, patients generally defer to their 
physicians.167 Buying health care is thus unlike shopping for a car, unless 
one imagines buying a car while being chased by a gunman, when there 
are only a couple unfamiliar models to choose from, relying upon the 
guidance of a trusted car salesman who tells you which car is best for 
your situation and also serves as your driver as you try to get away. 
Although market approaches attempt to address information asymmetry 
and moral hazard, the principal-agent problems persist. Health plans 
and/or providers are in the best position to gather, report, and translate 
price and quality information for patients, and thus market approaches 
build upon the existing web of principal-agent relationships.168 
Finally, market solutions like price transparency or reference pricing 
are inherently limited because much of health care is not “shoppable.”169 
Acute or urgent health care does not lend itself to comparison or price 
shopping, and patients end up seeking care at the nearest hospital, the 
one to which the ambulance delivers them, or the one to which they are 
referred to by their physician. 
Market solutions are premised on improving informational deficits 
and sensitizing consumers to their health care costs to bring competitive 
forces to bear on health care prices. As an overall strategy to discipline 
health care prices, however, market solutions are fundamentally limited 
because they fail to address the underlying lack of competition in 
hospital markets and barriers to patient consumer behavior.170 
 
 165. See supra Part I.B. 
 166. See supra text accompanying notes 12325. 
 167. See Greaney, supra note 64, at 1200. 
 168. Healthcare Fin. Mgmt. Ass’n, supra note 3, at 3 (“Health plans should serve as the principal 
source of price information for their members. . . . The provider should be the principal source of price 
information for uninsured patients and patients who are seeking care from the provider on an out-of-
network basis.”). 
 169. See White & Eguchi, supra note 144, at 4. 
 170. Paul B. Ginsburg, All-Payer Rate Setting: A Response to a ‘Modest Proposal’ from Uwe 
Reinhardt, Health Aff. Blog (July 24, 2009), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2009/07/24/all-payer-rate-
setting-a-response-to-a-modest-proposal-from-uwe-reinhardt/. 
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B. Antitrust Enforcement 
1. Antitrust Strategies to Address Hospital Market Power 
If market solutions fail to address the problem of health care market 
concentration, one response is to use antitrust laws to address provider 
market power.171 First, the FTC can use its power under section 7 of the 
Clayton Act to oppose horizontal hospital mergers that “lessen 
competition, or . . . tend to create a monopoly.”172 Using this approach, 
the antitrust agencies can block proposed mergers or, occasionally, seek 
divestiture of a consummated merger.173 The general analytic framework 
for horizontal mergers requires definition of the geographic and product 
markets at issue as well as assessment of the potential anticompetitive 
effects of the merged entity’s increased market share.174 
Second, under section 1 of the Sherman Act, antitrust agencies can 
police efforts by provider networks to engage in joint contracting with 
health plans, a form of price fixing among otherwise independent and 
competing providers.175 These types of provider networks implicate 
health care prices when hospitals vertically integrate with physician 
practices through ACOs, physician-hospital organizations, or physician 
practice acquisition.176 Hospitals can use these strategies to increase their 
market share by “locking up” physician referrals from large networks of 
physicians and bundling hospital and physician services together for 
greater bargaining leverage over payers.177 Antitrust scrutiny of provider 
networks is fact-specific, weighing the procompetitive efficiencies gained 
by clinically and/or financially integrating an otherwise disparate and 
fragmented web of providers against the anticompetitive effects of 
increased consolidation and market power.178 In the case of ACOs, the 
antitrust agencies will afford rule-of-reason treatment (not the stricter 
 
 171. Berenson et al., supra note 44, at 702 (quoting a health plan executive complaining about 
providers’ monopoly prices in California: “We’d welcome some regulatory intervention to break up 
these monopolies, because they are just killing us.”); Gaynor, supra note 42, at 1090; Havighurst & 
Richman, supra note 17, at 853. 
 172. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2013). 
 173. Cutler & Scott Morton, supra note 17, at 1969. 
 174. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf; see also Greaney, supra 
note 17, at 193. 
 175. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1; see Greaney, supra note 71, at 23. 
 176. Laurence C. Baker et al., Vertical Integration: Hospital Ownership of Physician Practices Is 
Associated with Higher Prices and Spending, 33 Health Aff. 756, 757 (2014). 
 177. Baker et al., supra note 175, at 75657; Ginsburg & Pawlson, supra note 152, at 1072. 
 178. See Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statements of Antitrust Enforcement in 
Health Care Policy, Statements 8 & 9 (1996) (describing antitrust agencies’ policies regarding 
physician network joint ventures and multiprovider networks). 
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per se analysis) to joint contracting by providers in ACOs that comply 
with all of the requirements to be a Medicare ACO.179 
Third, antitrust agencies can police anticompetitive efforts by 
dominant hospitalsoften in combination with dominant payersto 
entrench their market power, exclude rivals, and establish price-setting 
schemes.180 For example, hospital-payer contracts may undermine price 
competition through mechanisms such as anti-tiering or most favored 
nation (“MFN”) clauses.181 As discussed above, powerful providers may 
insist on anti-tiering or anti-steering provisions to prevent health plans 
from using different levels of cost-sharing to encourage enrollees to use 
lower priced providers.182 MFN provisions are typically used by dominant 
health plans to extract agreement from hospitals not to accept lower 
rates from another health plan competitor, thus contractually assuring 
the dominant plan will receive the best price and preventing price 
competition from other health plans.183 In other contexts, antitrust agencies 
have pursued collusion between “must-have” hospitals and dominant 
payers to protect the other from competition,184 or hospitals’ pricing 
discounts to payers in exchange for the payers’ agreement not to contract 
with or accept better prices from the hospital’s competitors.185 The color 
and stripe of antitrust abuse vary with the particulars of the market, but 
successful enforcement is rare and fact-intensive, with the law and 
outcomes often unclear. As a result, antitrust law is an inherently imperfect 
strategy to address the widespread monopoly problem in the hospital 
market.186 
2. Antitrust Strategies Measured Against Health Care Market 
Failures 
Aggressive antitrust enforcement may be critical to preserving 
competition in markets that have not already become highly concentrated. 
 
 179. Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations 
Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026, 67,026 (Oct. 28, 2011); see 
also Greaney, supra note 16, at 23 (noting that the ACO antitrust policy statement also establishes 
safety zones for calculating acceptable levels of market power that are specific to ACOs). 
 180. See Greaney, supra note 16, at 3031. 
 181. See Sage, supra note 49, at 108081. 
 182. See supra text accompanying note 156. 
 183. See, e.g., Complaint at 1, United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 809 F. Supp. 2d 665 
(E.D. Mich. 2010) (No. 2:10-CV-14155). 
 184. See, e.g., W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 185. Complaint at 1, United States v. United Reg’l Health Care Sys., (N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2011) 
(No. 7:11-cv-00030); Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 502 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2007). For a good 
discussion of these cases, see Greaney, supra note 71, at 2831. 
 186. Greaney, supra note 16, at 3031 (“While antitrust litigation can challenge these tactics, such 
cases are fact-intensive, require extensive analysis, and fall in areas in which the law remains unsettled. 
. . . As a result, antitrust law is more paper tiger than bulwark against abuse when dealing with 
incumbent monopolies.”). 
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As an overall solution to discipline health care prices, however, antitrust 
enforcement is significantly limited. There is little the antitrust laws can 
do to break up or reverse existing monopolies, so antitrust enforcement 
is little help to the many provider markets where concentration has 
already occurred.187 As forcefully stated by Thomas Greaney, 
A common misapprehension among legislators and policymakers is 
that antitrust law provides a reliable counterforce to monopoly. With 
respect to extant monopolies, legally acquired, the opposite is true: 
antitrust law tolerates the exercise of market power (which includes 
charging higher prices, reducing output, and lowering quality) and 
generally intervenes only where monopolists wrongfully exercise that 
power to exclude or harm rivals.188 
For a stretch of time from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, antitrust 
agencies ran into a judicial wall when opposing hospital mergers, with 
courts dealing the agencies seven consecutive losses.189 Although the 
FTC’s losing streak subsequently broke, it remains true today that 
antitrust enforcement to prevent hospital mergers has been largely 
ineffective at counteracting the wave of consolidation in the industry.190 
Market power gained lawfully is unreachable by antitrust 
enforcement.191 For example, a hospital may be a “must-have” hospital 
because it is one of the few providers of unique services such as a Level I 
Trauma unit, NICU, or transplant service.192 Or the hospital may be the 
sole provider in a rural area that cannot support more than one 
hospital.193 Other hospitals, like Cedars-Sinai in Los Angeles, may have a 
reputation that makes them powerful (in the case of Cedars-Sinai, it is 
the preferred hospital for Hollywood celebrities).194 Large, 
geographically dispersed health care systems may bargain collectively, 
 
 187. Cutler & Scott Morton, supra note 17, at 1969; Gaynor, supra note 42, at 1090; Havighurst & 
Richman, supra note 17, at 871. 
 188. Greaney, supra note 16, at 27. 
 189. See FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1053 (8th Cir. 1999); FTC v. Freeman 
Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 273 (8th Cir. 1995); California v. Sutter Health Sys., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1085 
(N.D. Cal. 2000), amended by 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2001); United States v. Long 
Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 
F. Supp. 1285, 1302-03 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff’d, No. 96-2440, 1997 WL 420543, at *1 (6th Cir. July 8, 
1997); United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 989 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated as moot, 
107 F.3d 632, 637 (8th Cir. 1997); Adventist Health Sys./West, 117 F.T.C. 224, 285 (1994); see also 
Thomas L. Greaney, Whither Antitrust? The Uncertain Future of Competition Law in Health Care, 
21 Health Aff. 185, 187 (noting that the cases show a “judicial disdain for applying traditional 
antitrust principles to health care providers”). 
 190. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 17, at 849 (“[The government’s] inability over time to 
apply antitrust law rigorously and systematically in the big business that health care has become is one 
importantthough not the onlyreason why many health care markets are now dominated by firms 
with alarming pricing power.”). 
 191. See Berenson et al., supra note 43, at 97374. 
 192. White et al., supra note 150, at 327. 
 193. See Berenson, supra note 162. 
 194. See Berenson et al., supra note 44, at 702. 
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leveraging a flagship hospital for higher prices across the system.195 But 
because the system’s facilities are spread out across many hospital 
markets, such collective price negotiation is typically beyond the reach of 
antitrust law.196 These types of market power were acquired legally and 
are not amenable to antitrust enforcement. 
Much of the current provider consolidation is occurring in response 
to payment and delivery reforms like ACOs or bundled payments, which 
may have many salutary benefits in terms of better care coordination, 
reduction of fragmentation, and improved quality.197 Thus, the antitrust 
agencies have chosen to tread lightly when it comes to these integration 
efforts despite their attendant risks to competition.198 Payment and 
delivery reforms address the principal-agent problem of providers’ inherent 
incentives to create demand for their own services, which antitrust policy 
does not address. Thus, antitrust policy has a difficult needle to thread: it 
must be flexible enough to accommodate health care delivery innovations 
while containing the effects of provider market power. 
Because antitrust enforcement can do little to address existing 
monopolies, antitrust enforcement is an inadequate solution to the 
problem of provider market power. Additional regulatory efforts are 
required to promote competition in the concentrated hospital market, 
such as repeal of state CON law regimes that prevent entry into the 
hospital market or avoidance of “any willing provider” laws that stymie 
narrow networks and price competition.199 However, even these augmented 
approaches to competition policy do not address providers’ motivations to 
consolidate: to increase bargaining leverage over a fragmented payer 
landscape.200 
Antitrust policy also does not touch many of the other features of 
market failure in the hospital market, such as information asymmetry, 
moral hazard, principal-agent problems, or externalities. As discussed in 
Part III, the theory of “second best” warns that where there are multiple 
types of market failure, addressing one but not the others might actually 
result in reduced efficiency and welfare and even worse outcomes than 
doing nothing at all.201 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. Berenson, supra note 43, at 976; Greaney, supra note 16, at 21. 
 197. Ginsburg & Pawlson, supra note 152, at 1067. 
 198. See Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations, 
supra note 179, at 67,026; see also Greaney, supra note 16, at 2324. 
 199. See Gaynor, supra note 42, at 109091. 
 200. See Berenson et al., supra note 43, at 977. 
 201. Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and the 
Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 849, 85354 (2000). 
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C. Payment and Delivery Reforms 
1. ACOs and Bundled Payments 
Payment and delivery reforms are premised on the hope that 
altering the financial incentives in our health care system will result in 
structural changes that fix the fragmented, inefficient, poor quality, and 
costly health care delivery system.202 Of all the payment and delivery 
reforms set in motion by the ACA, ACOs generated the most 
anticipation.203 ACOs are the flagship among an assortment of Medicare 
reforms in the ACA that all aim at paying for value in health care instead 
of volume.204 
In the early 2000s, researchers at Dartmouth’s Atlas of Health Care 
revealed large variations in Medicare spending across geographic regions 
and demonstrated that higher spending does not lead to better health 
outcomes.205 They concluded that approximately thirty percent of the 
nation’s Medicare spending could be eliminated without negative impacts 
on health simply by reducing geographic variations in spending.206 Because 
this research was based on Medicare spending, the variations were due to 
practice patterns and utilization, not differences in price. In the private 
market, geographic spending variations are compounded by price 
differences as well as utilization patterns.207 
The Dartmouth researchers, led by Elliott Fisher, devised a model 
now known as an ACO to create financial incentives and structural 
reforms to move the high-spending regions toward the practices of the 
more efficient regions.208 The idea of the ACO is to reward groups of 
physicians and other providers for improving quality and care coordination 
while reducing unnecessary utilization by paying them a share of the 
 
 202. See David Cutler, How Health Care Reform Must Bend the Cost Curve, 29 Health Aff. 1131, 
113334 (2010). 
 203. Rob Cunningham, The Payment Reform Paradox, 33 Health Aff. 735, 735 (2014). 
 204. See Greaney, supra note 16, at 1. 
 205. Elliott S. Fisher et al., The Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending. Part 1: 
The Content, Quality, and Accessibility of Care, 138 Annals Internal Med. 273, 273 (2003) 
[hereinafter Fisher et al., Regional Variations of Medicare Spending Part 1]; Elliott S. Fisher et al., The 
Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending. Part 2: Health Outcomes and Satisfaction 
with Care, 138 Annals Internal Med. 288, 288 (2003) [hereinafter Fisher et al., Regional Variations 
of Medicare Spending Part 2]. 
 206. Fisher et al., Regional Variations of Medicare Spending Part 1, supra note 205, at 273. 
 207. Newhouse & Garber, supra note 46, at 1227–28 (“Whereas price variation explains almost 
none of the overall variation in Medicare expenditures (after adjusting for wage variation), price 
variation is responsible for an estimated 70% of the total geographic variation in spending among 
privately insured persons.”). 
 208. Transcript of Proceedings at 280–363, Medicare Payment Advisory Comm’n: Pub. Meeting 
(Nov. 9, 2006), http://www.medpac.gov/documents/november-2006-meeting-transcript.pdf (describing 
the ACO model variously as “extended hospital staff” and “accountable organization”); see also 
Elliott S. Fisher et al., Creating Accountable Care Organizations: The Extended Hospital Medical Staff, 
26 Health Aff. w44 (2006–2007). 
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amount they save for the payer.209 The model was adopted by the ACA in 
the form of the Medicare Shared Savings Program, which establishes 
ACOs for Medicare with the intent that the model will spread to the 
private market.210 The goal is to move the health care market away from 
the inefficient, highly fragmented, volume-based fee-for-service payment 
model toward a more efficient, coordinated, and value-based system.211 
In a similar vein, the ACA also created a pilot program to bundle 
Medicare payments for an entire episode of care for certain conditions, 
where the hospital receives a single lump sum payment to cover all 
inpatient, physician, outpatient, and post-acute services involved in the 
episode of care.212 Payment bundling creates incentives for fragmented 
providers to work together, improve efficiency, and internalize the costs 
of a poorly managed episode of care. 
The strategies underlying ACOs and payment bundling are not new; 
they are similar to the ways providers assumed financial risks (and 
benefits) under capitated payments from managed care companies in the 
1990s.213 The main differences are that ACO models seek to preserve 
patients’ choice of provider and are designed to be driven by providers 
rather than by payers.214 In their purest form, HMOs with capitation did 
reduce health care spending and utilization, but patients and providers 
alike opposed them as blunt instruments of rationing and because of 
limitations in their choice of providers.215 
As discussed above, ACOs and bundled payments create pressures 
for providers to consolidate, particularly through vertically integrated 
networks of physicians, hospitals, and post-acute providers.216 In its benign 
form, ACOs encourage efficient consolidation because they require 
providers to come together to coordinate care, assume financial risk, and 
share and report data.217 The consolidation may improve efficiency by 
reducing duplicative or wasteful services, as well as by aligning the 
financial and clinical incentives of disparate providers. In the private market, 
however, vertical integration and ACO formation may be motivated as 
much or more by the desire to gain market share and bargaining leverage 
 
 209. Elliott S. Fisher et al., Fostering Accountable Health Care: Moving Forward in Medicare, 
28 Health Aff. w219, w222 (2009). 
 210. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2013); see also Greaney, supra note 16, at 1617. 
 211. Fisher, supra note 209, at w221. 
 212. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-4 (2013); accord White et al., supra note 150, at 2. 
 213. Robert A. Berenson & Rachel A. Burton, Urban Inst., Accountable Care 
Organizations in Medicare and the Private Sector: A Status Update 12 (2011). 
 214. See Greaney, supra note 16, at 7. 
 215. See Berenson & Burton, supra note 213, at 1; see also Muir et al., supra note 15, at 339. 
 216. See supra Part I.B. 
 217. See Baker et al., supra note 176, at 762. 
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against health plans, which may work against the goals of systemic cost-
savings or rationalization of care.218 
2. Payment and Delivery Reforms Measured Against Health Care 
Market Failures 
At their heart, payment and delivery reforms are not aimed at 
disciplining health care prices. ACOs and bundled payments attempt to 
restrain overall health care spending by reducing unnecessary utilization, 
not by constraining prices. Simply altering the payment methodology 
does not have much influence on ultimate prices.219 Importantly, these 
reforms do not address the market concentration problem and in fact 
exacerbate it by spurring further consolidation among providers.220 
Payment and delivery reforms have some prospect of addressing the 
informational asymmetries in health care prices. The hope is that 
measuring ACOs for quality performance and cost-savings will also 
improve cost and quality transparency of participating providers.221 To 
the extent that payment bundling groups together disparate parts of an 
episode of care, it may create a more understandable and comparable 
product to evaluate for price or quality purposes. For example, it is easier 
to comparison shop for an entire episode of care, such as the total cost of 
delivering a baby, than for each unbundled piece of the care.222 However, 
there is nothing inherent about the ACO model or bundled payments 
that encourage patients to deploy consumeristic choices amongst 
providers. If anything, the incentive runs in the opposite direction, 
encouraging patients to stay within the ACO or group of providers included 
in the bundled payment rather than shopping among competitors. 
Of all the health care market failures, payment and delivery reforms 
most directly address the principal-agent problem by attempting to align 
the incentives of the payer and different providers (hospital, physicians, 
post-acute care, and so on) involved in the patient’s care.223 Payment and 
 
 218. Cunningham, supra note 203, at 737 (“If the object of these alliances is to make more money, 
they can’t be expected to transform health care.”). 
 219. See Massachusetts AG 2010 Report, supra note 10, at 4 (“Variation in total medical expenses 
on a per member per month basis is not correlated to the methodology used to pay for health care, 
with total medical expenses sometimes higher for risk-sharing providers than for providers paid on a 
fee-for-service basis.”). 
 220. See Austin Frakt, Bigger Health Companies: Good for Medicare, Maybe Not for Others, N.Y. 
Times: Upshot (June 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/24/upshot/bigger-health-companies-
good-for-medicare-maybe-not-for-others.html. 
 221. See Fisher et al., supra note 208, at w223. 
 222. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, American Way of Birth, Costliest in the World, N.Y. Times (June 30, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/01/health/american-way-of-birth-costliest-in-the-world.html (“Only 
in the United States is pregnancy generally billed item by item, a practice that has spiraled in the past 
decade, doctors say. No item is too small. Charges that 20 years ago were lumped together and 
covered under the general hospital fee are now broken out, leading to more bills and inflated costs.”). 
 223. See Greaney, supra note 16, at 45, 1516. 
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delivery reforms address the central principal-agent relationship between 
the patient and the physician who directs the patient’s care, by 
dampening the physician’s financial incentives to order unnecessary and 
potentially harmful tests and services.224 The providers’ incentives are 
also aligned with the payers’ because if the providers save the payer 
money, then the providers share some of the savings. 
In the end, the payment and delivery reforms’ abilities to discipline 
health care prices are threatened by their tendency to increase provider 
market power.225 Hospitals, physician groups, and other providers are 
consolidating to form ACOs, which can lead to higher prices in the 
private market.226 Perversely, the ACOs’ constraints on utilization may 
create incentives for providers with market power to raise their prices. 
As bluntly stated by the Urban Institute’s Robert Berenson, “[I]t is 
unlikely that an organization can offset the higher spending resulting 
from exorbitant prices by decreasing the volume of services. Or put more 
pithily, higher prices eat decreased volume for lunch.”227 
D. Consumer Protections 
Consumer protections take aim at only one aspect of the hospital 
pricing problem: the externalities of excessive hospital prices and 
aggressive debt collection on individual patients who may be uninsured 
or underinsured. Consumer protections can take the form of stronger 
judicial supervision in favor of the consumer when enforcing contracts for 
services between hospitals and self-pay patients. Alternatively, consumer 
protections could take the form of state fair pricing and collection laws 
that limit the amounts hospitals may charge to financially vulnerable 
patients and their bill collection actions.228 Overall, the consumer protection 
approach does not attempt to rationalize the whole system of hospital 
pricing, but rather protects the individual patient from the externalities 
of unreasonable hospital prices. 
 
 224. See Fisher, supra note 209, at w22021. 
 225. See Greaney, supra note 16, at 20 (“Provider market power poses the biggest obstacle to the 
success of the ACO strategy.”). 
 226. See Baker et al., supra note 176, at 75657. 
 227. See Berenson, supra note 162. 
 228. A third alternative would be for a patient to pursue a claim against hospitals for violating 
state consumer protection statutes prohibiting unfair and deceptive trade practices (“UDTPs”). 
Despite the near-perfect fit between the legal conception of unfairness and hospital billing practices 
toward uninsured or out-of-network patients, courts have generally been hostile to claims by 
uninsured patients under state UDTP laws. See, e.g., Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 382 F. Supp. 
2d 562, 565–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated in part on jurisdiction grounds, Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian 
Hosp., 455 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2006); Grant v. Trinity Health-Mich., 390 F. Supp. 2d 643, 647 n.6 (E.D. 
Mich. 2005) (listing twenty-eight other cases in various federal districts where defendant hospitals 
obtained dismissals in suits presented by uninsured or indigent patients). 
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1. Contract Law and Muscular Supervisory Doctrines 
Uninsured or out-of-network patients are generally charged what 
are known as “full charges,” or the retail list prices for hospital services.229 
These highly inflated prices are more than twice what private insurers 
pay and three to five times higher than government payers.230 Largely in 
response to the problem of the uninsured being charged full, undiscounted 
hospital prices, Mark Hall and Carl Schneider have advocated that courts 
adopt a protective stance through muscular use of supervisory doctrines 
when enforcing contracts between hospitals and uninsured patients for 
services.231 The supervisory doctrines would allow courts to revise or 
reject vague or oppressive contracts when, as is the case of uninsured 
patients, one party lacks any meaningful bargaining power and enters the 
contract in a vulnerable state. 
The supervisory doctrines Hall and Schneider have advocated include: 
(1) supplying vague or missing price terms, such as when hospital contracts 
obligate patients to pay a hospital’s “usual charges” or “regular rates,”232 
(2) amending or refusing to enforce unconscionable hospital-patient 
contracts,233 and (3) evaluating the fairness of health care fiduciaries’ pricing 
in open-ended hospital contracts for services.234 Courts can deploy these 
doctrines to substitute a more reasonable price for the ones often charged 
by hospitals to uninsured or self-pay patients.235 The larger argument 
advanced by Hall and Schneider is that courts should not treat as ordinary 
commercial contracts the essentially nonnegotiable agreements by self-
pay patients in a state of medical duress to pay a hospital whatever it 
wants to charge. Rather, knowing the complexities and failures of health 
care markets, courts should feel empowered to supervise and adjust 
these lopsided contract terms as needed to make them more fair and 
reasonable. 
Use of the supervisory doctrines tends to focus on the unequal 
bargaining power between an uninsured, vulnerable patient and a hospital. 
Although hospital-patient contracts are arguably equally unconscionable 
regardless of the patient’s education or means, courts might be less 
willing to use the supervisory doctrines to protect the more affluent or 
sophisticated consumers, who might not be perceived to be as vulnerable 
 
 229. See Michael E. Porter & Elizabeth Olmsted Teisberg, Redefining Health Care 65 
(2006); Anderson, supra note 11, at 780. 
 230. Barry Meier et al., Hospital Billing Varies Wildly, Government Data Shows, N.Y. Times (May 8, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/08/business/hospital-billing-varies-wildly-us-data-shows.html; Uwe E. 
Reinhardt, What Hospitals Charge the Uninsured, N.Y. Times: Economix (Mar. 15, 2013, 6:00 AM), 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/15/what-hospitals-charge-the-uninsured/. 
 231. Hall & Schneider, supra note 18, at 671. 
 232. Id. at 673. 
 233. Id. at 678. 
 234. Id. at 681. 
 235. Id. at 68485. 
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and worthy of protection as the uninsured poor. For insured patients who 
receive care out-of-network and are charged inflated prices, courts might 
be even less willing to use supervisory doctrines because the patient’s 
insurance contract likely specifies that out-of-network care is not covered 
or that the patient may be charged additional amounts from an out-of-
network provider. 
When an insured patient receives hospital care out-of-network, the 
hospital does not have a contractual, negotiated rate with the health plan.236 
If the health plan covers the patient’s out-of-network care at all, the plan 
typically specifies it will pay the noncontracted provider its “usual, 
customary, and reasonable rates” (“UCR”).237 UCR is indeterminate and 
often requires litigation to assign a specific dollar value to the rate.238 In 
addition, the out-of-network provider will typically charge the patient a 
“balance bill” for the difference between the UCR amount received from 
the health plan and the hospital’s full charges, which can be a substantial 
proportion of the bill. Patients are increasingly finding themselves 
subject to out-of-network billing with the resurgence of narrow networks 
under the ACA.239 Even if a patient takes pains to select an in-network 
hospital, she may be subject to surprise out-of-network prices because 
the physicians who treated her were out-of-network.240 
When adjudicating the amount owed by self-pay patients or non-
contracted health plans for hospital services, courts engage in the critical 
task of assigning a reasonable value to undefined prices. Although 
assigning value to UCR would appear to be a simple matter of 
determining the fair market value for specified services in the geographic 
market, courts struggle with this fact-intensive task and have used 
myriad, often conflicting, approaches to assigning values to UCR.241 
Possible methods include calculating UCR based on (1) Medicare rates 
or a multiplier of Medicare rates;242 (2) administratively determined fee 
schedules, such as state-based rates for workers’ compensation or auto 
 
 236. See Porter & Teisberg, supra note 229, at 65; Anderson, supra note 11, at 781. 
 237. Carol K. Lucas & Michelle A. Williams, The Rights of Nonparticipating Providers in a 
Managed Care World: Navigating the Minefields of Balance Billing and Reasonable and Customary 
Payments, 3 J. Health & Life Sci. L. 132, 138 (2009). UCR or a similar concept may also be used to 
determine the amount an uninsured patient should pay for her care. 
 238. Id. 
 239. See supra text accompanying notes 15254. 
 240. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Costs Can Go Up Fast When E.R. Is in Network but the Doctors Are Not, 
N.Y. Times (Sept. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/29/us/costs-can-go-up-fast-when-er-is-in-
network-but-the-doctors-are-not.html?ref=health. 
 241. David Stahl, Health Care Reform: Presumptively Reasonable Rates for Necessary Medical 
Services, 35 Nova L. Rev. 175, 18182 (2010). 
 242. See, e.g., In re Adoption of N.J.A.C., 979 A.2d 770, 774 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) 
(interpreting the reasonable fee to be 130 percent of the Medicare rate). 
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insurance rates for hospital services;243 (3) independent third party 
databases like FairHealth.org;244 (4) the amounts the hospital generally 
accepts from its other payers, including or excluding Medicare and 
Medicaid;245 or (5) the hospital’s full charges.246 
Each methodology has advantages and drawbacks, which further 
depend on whether one is calculating rates owed by an uninsured patient 
or a non-contracted health plan. For example, some have advocated 
using a multiplier of Medicare rates to set a reasonable price for a self-
pay patient because Medicare rates are transparent, widely available, and 
are relatively free from distortions of hospital market power.247 However, 
 
 243. Workers compensation and auto insurers typically do not have contracted rates with hospitals 
because their members make up so little of a hospital’s patient volume, so some states have 
established fee schedules applicable to these payers to avoid them being charged full charges. See Fuse 
Brown, supra note 7, at 51; Stahl, supra note 241, at 18990. 
 244. FAQs, FairHealth.org, http://www.fairhealth.org/CorporateFAQs (last visited Dec. 18, 
2015). FairHealth.org was the result of an investigation by State Attorney General of New York in 
2009 into the Ingenix database owned and operated by health insurance giant United Healthcare. The 
investigation alleged that United had conflicts of interest and used biased data in the Ingenix database 
to produce inaccurate, lower UCR calculations owed by insurance companies to providers for out-of-
network care. The litigation and investigation resulted in a 2009 settlement with health insurers that 
called for the creation of an independent, not-for-profit database called FairHealth. For more 
discussions of the Ingenix controversy, see Lucas & Williams, supra note 237, at 15562; Troy J. 
Oechsner & Magda Schaler-Haynes, Keeping It Simple: Health Plan Benefit Standardization and 
Regulatory Choice Under the Affordable Care Act, 74 Alb. L. Rev. 241, 27579 (2010); Stahl, supra 
note 241, 18587. 
 245. See, e.g., Baker Cty. Med. Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Health Mgmt., LLC, 31 So. 3d 842, 845 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (excluding Medicare and Medicaid rates); Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Healthcare 
Mgmt. Alts., Inc., 832 A.2d 501, 50910 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (including Medicare and Medicaid rates). 
Data of this sort is not always readily available because negotiated rates may be subject to contractual 
confidentiality clauses. Thus, obtaining actual payment data requires more administrative digging (or 
discovery) than reference to an existing fee schedule like Medicare. 
 246. Some courts recognize that full charges are not “reasonable” rates because they are inflated 
and no payer with any bargaining clout pays anything close to these rates. See, e.g., Greenfield v. 
Manor Care, Inc., 705 So. 2d 926, 930–31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Payne v. Humana Hosp. Orange 
Park, 661 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Victory Mem’l Hosp. v. Rice, 493 N.E.2d 117, 119 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1986); In re Adoption of N.J.A.C., 979 A.2d at 785; Doe v. HCA Health Servs. of Tenn., Inc., 
46 S.W.3d 191 (Tenn. 2001). Other courts, however, have concluded that billed charges are 
“reasonable” because they are what is usually or customarily charged to self-pay patients or 
noncontracted payers. See, e.g., Allen v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc., 980 N.E.2d 306, 311 (Ind. 2012) 
(holding that a patient’s agreement to pay “the account” in a contract to provide medical services is 
not indefinite and refers to the hospital’s chargemaster); Holland v. Trinity Health Care Corp., 791 
N.W.2d 724, 728 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that “usual and customary charges” referred to the 
hospital’s chargemaster prices because Black’s Law Dictionary defines charge as “to demand a fee; to 
bill.”); Huntington Hosp. v. Abrandt, 779 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (App. Div. 2004); accord Kolari v. N.Y.-
Presbyterian Hosp., 382 F. Supp. 2d 562, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[U]nder New York law a hospital’s 
charges to an uninsured patient are not unreasonable merely because a lower price is charged to 
government programs or other insurers.”); Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp. v. Huberty, 428 N.Y.S.2d 746 
(App. Div. 1980). 
 247. Gerard Anderson has proposed that reasonable rates to charge a self-pay patient would be 
125 percent of Medicare rates, which is higher than most commercial payers’ negotiated rates, but 
significantly lower than full charges. Medicare rates are based on a methodology that takes into 
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because they tend to be lower than private rates and typical calculations 
of UCR, using a multiplier of Medicare for out-of-network care means 
the health plan pays less and the balance bill for the insured patient 
increases.248 Regardless of the methodology used to determine UCR for a 
noncontracted provider, the court ought to keep in mind the harm to the 
patient that comes from balance billing even if the plan’s payment 
obligation is satisfied. Without legislation prohibiting balance billing, 
courts might be without power to stop a hospital from balance billing a 
patient even if the court is able to resolve how much the noncontracted 
health plan owes.249 
2. Hospital Fair Pricing and Balance Billing Laws 
Thirteen states have passed laws that limit the amount hospitals may 
charge to uninsured or self-pay patients who fall below defined income 
levels.250 Many of these states plus some additional states that do not limit 
charges to uninsured or underinsured patients, also regulate the debt 
collection practices hospitals use to recover medical debt from patients,251 
including limitations on interest rates, liens or foreclosure actions on a 
patient’s home, and wage garnishment, as well as obligations to offer 
payment plans and defer assigning debt to collection agencies for 
 
account the hospital’s costs, geographic variation, and resource intensity of particular services. See 
Anderson, supra note 11, at 787. Mark Hall and Carl Schneider suggested capping rates that providers 
may charge self-pay patients at 150 percent of Medicare rates or a weighted average of what large 
private insurers pay in the region. Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Price-Gouging by Doctors and 
Hospitals, Health Reform Watch (July 19, 2009), http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2009/07/19/price-
gouging-by-doctors-and-hospitals/. 
 248. Nina Bernstein, Insurers Alter Cost Formula, and Patients Pay More, N.Y. Times (Apr. 23, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/24/nyregion/health-insurers-switch-baseline-for-out-of-network- 
charges.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (observing an increasing trend toward insurance companies 
paying 140 percent to 250 percent of Medicare for out-of-network care, instead of eighty percent of 
UCR, resulting in lower payments by the insurance plan and large balance-bills for the patient). 
 249. For discussion of state balance billing bans, see infra Part II.D.3. 
 250. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 127400-127446 (West 2012); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-3-112 
(2013); Conn. Gen.Stat. § 19a-673 (West 2014); 210 Ill. Comp. Stat. 88/1-88/999 (2013); Md. Code 
Ann. Health-Gen. §§ 19-214.2, -214.3 (West 2013); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-7-35 (West 2014); Nev. 
Rev. Stat. § 439B.260 (2014); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2H-12.52 (West 2013); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 
2807-k (McKinney 2013); Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-723.2 (2007); 27-50 R.I. Code R. § 11.0:31-4-9 
(LexisNexis 2011); Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-262 (2015); Wash. Rev. Code § 70.170.010–.905 (1998). 
Although it has not passed a law, Utah has issued administrative guidance outlining standards for 
property tax exemption that includes a requirement that nonprofit hospitals not charge indigent 
patients for medically necessary care. Utah State Tax Comm’n, Property Tax Exemptions: Standards 
of Practice 26–29 (2015), http://propertytax.utah.gov/library/pdf/standards/standard02.pdf. See generally 
Hosp. Cmty. Benefit Program, Hilltop Inst., http://www.hilltopinstitute.org/hcbp_cbl_state_table. 
cfm?select=lcbc; Families U.S.A., Medical Debt: What States Are Doing to Protect Consumers 
(2009), http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/medical-debt-state-protections.pdf. 
 251. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-2310(c) (2005); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20:1(A)(2) (2014); Me. Rev. Stat. 
tit. 9-A, §5-116-A (2009); 114.6 Mass. Code Regs. § 12.08(1)(b) (2015); N.D. Cent. Code § 13-01-
14.1(4) (2001); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2329.66(A)(1)(a) (West Supp. 2013). See Hosp. Cmty. Benefit 
Program, supra note 250. 
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specified time periods.252 At the federal level, the ACA created new 
requirements limiting the amount tax-exempt hospitals may charge to 
patients who are eligible under the hospital’s financial assistance policy 
as well as requiring such hospitals to make reasonable efforts to 
determine eligibility before pursuing debt collection actions.253 
An example is California’s Fair Pricing Act, passed in 2006, which 
limits the amounts hospitals may charge uninsured patients below three 
hundred and fifty percent of the federal poverty limit (“FPL”) or insured 
patients below three hundred and fifty percent of the FPL whose medical 
bills exceed ten percent of their income.254 Hospitals may not charge 
these patients more than the highest amount paid by any government 
program (for example, Medicare, Medicaid, or CHIP). By 2011, most 
California hospitals had adopted financial assistance policies and gone 
beyond the bare requirements of the Act, with ninety-seven percent 
offering free care to those below one hundred percent of the FPL and a 
significant percentage limiting charges to Medicare rates for those above 
three hundred fifty percent of FPL.255 New Jersey passed a law in 2008 
that limits the amount hospitals may charge uninsured patients who 
make up to five hundred percent of the FPL to Medicare rates plus 
fifteen percent and requires hospitals to provide free care to those who 
make less than two hundred percent of the FPL.256 
These laws cap rates for financially vulnerable patients, but they do 
not eliminate price discrimination among payers or prevent inflated 
charges to middle class uninsured patients, or insured patients who are 
out-of-network.257 Nor do they address hospitals’ market power and 
variations in price. These laws seek to reduce the number of people who 
are billed full charges without actually rationalizing these charges. 
Virtually every state has laws restricting balance billing by in-
network providers to managed care enrollees, but twelve states extend 
 
 252. See Erin C. Fuse Brown, Fair Hospital Prices Are Not Charity: Decoupling Hospital Pricing 
and Collection Rules from Tax Status, 53 U. Louisville L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 43–44). 
 253. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 85558 (2010), 
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 
(2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 501(r)(2014)). The federal 501(r) rules contain many gaps in protection, 
including that they do not apply to for-profit or government-run facilities and they leave eligibility for 
financial assistance to the complete discretion of hospitals. For an in-depth discussion of the 501(r) 
rules and state fair pricing laws, see Fuse Brown, supra note 252, at 4243. 
 254. Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 127400-127446 (West 2012); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 22, 
§§ 96000–96150 (2007); see Glenn Melnick & Katya Fonkych, Fair Pricing Law Prompts Most 
California Hospitals to Adopt Policies to Protect Uninsured Patients from High Charges, 32 Health 
Aff. 1101, 1102 (2013). 
 255. See Melnick & Fonkych, supra note 254, at 1104. 
 256. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2H-12.52 (West 2013). 
 257. See Anderson, supra note 11, at 768–87. 
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balance billing restrictions even to out-of-network providers.258 These 
states include California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Maryland, 
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, 
and West Virginia.259 Although these laws vary in scope and degree, 
balance billing prohibitions generally protect the patient from receiving 
bills for the difference between what their health plan pays the out-of-
network provider and the provider’s full charges.260 Some laws only apply 
to emergency services, while others apply to a broader range of covered 
benefits.261 Balance billing is a problem in nonemergency care, such as 
when the hospital is in-network, but the surgeon or anesthesiologist is 
out-of-network.262 In addition, state balance billing laws may be 
preempted by ERISA for self-insured employer plans. 
 
 258. State Restriction Against Providers Balance Billing Managed Care Enrollees, Henry J. Kaiser 
Fam. Found., http://kff.org/private-insurance/state-indicator/state-restriction-against-providers-balance- 
billing-managed-care-enrollees/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
 259. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1379 (West 2013); Prospect Med. Grp. v. Northridge 
Emergency Med. Grp., 198 P.3d 86 (Cal. 2009) (ruling that HMO members may not be balanced 
billed); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 20-7f (West 1998) (protecting an enrollee of a managed care plan 
from balance billing from “any health care provider”); Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 3565 (2011) 
(protecting members of “individual and group health insurance policies” from balance billing); Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 19, § 2322F (2009) (protecting those covered by workers compensation from balance 
billing); Fla. Stat. § 641.3154, .513 (2015) (protecting HMO members from balance billing for non-
network emergency care); Fla. Stat. § 641.513 (2015) (protecting HMO members from balance billing 
for non-network emergency care); Ind. Code § 32-33-4-3.5 (2013) (prohibiting hospital lienholders 
from balance billing patients); Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. § 19-710(i) (West 2014) (holding HMO 
subscribers harmless for covered services in and out of network; statute mandates HMO payment to 
non-contractual providers); N.J. Admin. Code § 11:3-29.6 (protecting “any person” from balance 
billing by health care providers); 2014 N.Y. Sess. Law § 6914 (McKinney) (protecting individuals 
insured under a health care plan from balance billing for a “surprise bill” by a “non-participating 
physician” that knows the individual is insured); 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 449.34 (West 1990) (prohibiting 
any primary health care practitioner, or any primary health center, corporation, facility, institution or 
other entity that employs a health care practitioner from balance billing); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 27-
41-26 (West 2003) (protecting enrollees of an HMO from balance billing by “any provider” for charges 
for covered health services); Utah Code Ann. § 31A-8-501(5) (West 2012) (prohibiting out-of-
network providers from balance billing when an HMO or PPO enrollee lives or resides within thirty 
miles of a federally qualified health center or independent hospital or is in closer proximity to these 
providers than another contracting hospital); W. Va. Code § 33-25A-7a (1996) (protecting HMO 
members from balance billing if the provider is aware patient is HMO subscriber). In addition, 
Colorado requires managed care companies to hold members harmless for out-of-network balance 
bills, but it does not prevent the provider from balance billing. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-16-704(2)(a) 
(2015). 
 260. See Jack Hoadley et al., Unexpected Charges: What States Are Doing About Balance 
Billing 69 (2009). 
 261. See State Restriction Against Providers, supra note 258. 
 262. See Ginsburg, supra note 24, at 6; Roni Caryn Rabin, Out-of-Network Bills for In-Network 
Health Care, N.Y. Times (Nov. 19, 2012, 4:23 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/19/out-of-
network-bills-for-in-network-health-care/; Tara Siegel Bernard, Out of Network, Not by Choice, and 
Facing Huge Health Bills, N.Y. Times (Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/19/your-
money/out-of-network-not-by-choice-and-facing-huge-health-bills.html. 
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These balance billing laws shield a subset of patients including 
insured persons receiving care out-of-network from the harms of excess 
hospital charges. As with many of these solutions, balance billing laws do 
not address the fundamental market failures afflicting hospital pricing. 
Nevertheless, balance billing laws remain an important protection for 
individuals, especially as the proliferation of narrow networks makes it 
more likely a patient will find herself out-of-network.263 
3. Consumer Protections Measured Against Health Care Market 
Failures 
The consumer protection solutions are not really solutions to 
discipline health care prices on the whole, but to protect some of the 
most vulnerable patients from the harms of unrestrained hospital pricing. 
The main market failure addressed by consumer protection is the 
externalities imposed on individual patients when they are charged 
excessive prices because they are uninsured or underinsured. 
Judicial supervision of hospital-patient contracts generally proceeds 
case by case, individualized on the level of the hospital or patient. Under 
the broader fair pricing laws, hospitals are forced to curtail some of the 
excessive pricing and collection practices for the financially vulnerable. 
However, none of the consumer protection approaches address the 
information asymmetries, the price distortions of provider market power, 
or principal-agent problems that characterize the health care market. A 
powerful hospital could still exact supracompetitive prices to the rest of 
the market even if it must charge fairer prices to the uninsured or 
underinsured patient. 
E. Rate Regulation 
Health economists who study the issue of health care pricing are less 
sanguine than politicians about the ability of market strategies such as 
transparency and CDHC to discipline hospital prices and curb health 
care spending. Antitrust enforcers can do little to address extant provider 
monopolies. Payment and delivery reforms are increasing provider 
market consolidation while they try to improve health care quality and 
efficiency. Consumer protection approaches have limited potential as a 
systemic policy solution because they only protect a limited segment of 
the population from excessive hospital prices. Thus, whether 
enthusiastically or grudgingly, nearly every prominent health economist 
or policy analyst with expertise in health care pricing ultimately 
concludes that the only solution that may be effective in a concentrated 
 
 263. See supra text accompanying notes 152–54. 
H - Fuse Brown_26 (Hamilton12.7) (Do Not Delete) 12/15/2015 6:00 PM 
December 2015]        RESURRECTING HEALTH CARE RATE REGULATION 129 
provider market is regulation of health care prices.264 The best-known 
example of rate regulation is Maryland’s all-payer rate setting model, but 
other models include a version of rate-setting that allows some price 
variation between hospitals, caps on rates negotiated by private payers, 
or global budgets. 
1. All Payer Rate Setting 
Under an all-payer system, hospitals are paid the same rate for a 
given service by all payers, whether insurers, government programs, or 
self-pay patients ineligible for charity care.265 The prices are set by either 
a governmental agency using a public utility model or by collective 
negotiation between representatives of hospitals and payers for prices 
binding on all hospitals.266 Maryland is the only state currently using an 
all-payer system that sets the prices for all payers through the regulatory, 
public utility model. Pursuant to legislation enacted in 1971, Maryland 
established an independent rate setting agency to set hospital rates for all 
payers, including Medicare and Medicaid.267 The agency collects detailed 
information about costs, patient volumes, hospital finances, and services 
at each hospital to inform its rates.268 As for the latter model of 
collectively negotiated prices, there are no examples from the United 
States, but there are examples from Japan, Germany, France, 
Switzerland, and other OECD countries.269 For consistency and 
administrative ease, the all-payer fee schedule could be based on 
Medicare DRGs. To the extent that Medicare is not included in the all-
 
 264. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 11, at 786–87; Berenson et al., supra note 43, at 979; Cutler & 
Scott Morton, supra note 17, at 1969; Ginsburg, supra note 170; Ginsburg & Pawlson, supra note 152, 
at 1073; Thomas L. Greaney, The Affordable Care Act and Competition Policy: Antidote or Placebo?, 
89 Or. L. Rev. 811, 840–41 (2011); Robert Murray, Setting Hospital Rates to Control Costs and Boost 
Quality: The Maryland Experience, 28 Health Aff. 1395, 1395 (2009); Joseph P. Newhouse, Assessing 
Health Reform’s Impact on Four Key Groups of Americans, 29 Health Aff. 1, 10 (2010); N.J. Dep’t of 
Health, supra note 27; Reinhardt, supra note 26, at 2125; Vladeck, supra note 13, at 1086; Vladeck & 
Rice, supra note 13, at 1312–13; White et al., supra note 147, at 330; Austin Frakt, Simply Put: All-
Payer Rate Setting, Incidental Economist Blog (Apr. 8, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/ 
wordpress/simply-put-all-payer-rate-setting/. 
 265. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Equalizing Health Provider Rates: All-Payer 
Rate Setting (2010), http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/documents/health/ALL_PAYER_RATES-2010.pdf; 
Reinhardt, supra note 26, at 2129. 
 266. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 265, at 1. 
 267. See Murray, supra note 264, at 1395–96. Maryland received a waiver in 1971 to allow it to set 
hospital rates for Medicare and Medicaid patients. A similar waiver from CMS would be required in 
other states that want to include Medicare and Medicaid in its all-payer rates. 
 268. Id. 
 269. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, A Modest Proposal on Payment Reform, Health Aff. Blog (July 24, 2009), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2009/07/24/a-modest-proposal-on-payment-reform/ [hereinafter Reinhardt, A 
Modest Proposal]; Reinhardt, supra note 26, at 2129; Vladeck & Rice, supra note 13, at 1313. 
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payer system, the private rates could be expressed as a simple multiplier 
of Medicare rates.270 
An all-payer system addresses many of the complexities and 
perversities of hospital pricing. First, all-payer systems reduce or 
eliminate price discrimination by creating uniform rates for everyone, 
regardless of whether one is insured by a big health plan, a small plan, a 
government program, workers compensation, or are a self-pay patient. 
An all-payer approach flattens the inequities of price discrimination, 
where those with the least bargaining power pay the highest prices.271 
Setting uniform rates for all payers also reduces the administrative costs 
of negotiating with and maintaining separate billing systems for each 
payer.272 These administrative costs are significant, with U.S. hospitals’ 
administrative costs totaling about twenty-five percent of their total 
costs.273 Because of the fragmented payer landscape, U.S. hospitals spend 
far more on administrative costs than other wealthy countries with all-
payer or single-payer systems.274 
Most importantly, all-payer rates combat the market power of 
hospitals that drives price inflation, either because the rates are set by an 
administrative body or by combining the bargaining power of all the 
payers to negotiate lower prices.275 By constraining market power and 
regulating prices, all-payer rate setting also has the potential to control 
rising health care spending.276 As a result of its all-payer system, 
Maryland has by far the lowest hospital price markups in the country, 
almost a hundred times lower than New Jersey’s, a state that abandoned 
its own all-payer system in 1992.277 Maryland’s all-payer rate setting has 
effectively constrained growth in costs per hospital case.278 Skeptics note, 
however, that the cost-per-case savings in Maryland’s system have been 
 
 270. See Vladeck & Rice, supra note 13, at 1313. 
 271. Murray, supra note 264, at 1400–01. 
 272. See Reinhardt, supra note 26, at 2126. 
 273. David U. Himmelstein et al., A Comparison of Hospital Administrative Costs in Eight 
Nations: US Costs Exceed All Others by Far, 33 Health Aff. 1586, 1589 (2014). 
 274. Id. at 1591–92. 
 275. See Frakt, supra note 264. 
 276. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 265, at 2; Graham Atkinson, State 
Hospital Rate-Setting Revisited, 69 Commonwealth Fund 1332, 2 (Oct. 2009); Reinhardt, supra note 
26, at 2129. 
 277. See Karan Chhabra, Chargemaster Tomfoolery, Policy Responses, and Unintended 
Consequences (In Four Charts), Project Millennial Blog (May 17, 2013), http://projectmillennial.org/ 
2013/05/17/chargemaster-tomfoolery-policy-responses-and-unintended-consequences-in-four-charts/. 
 278. See Murray, supra note 261, at 1399, 1403. Maryland’s system is not perfect, however. Murray 
further notes that although costs-per-admission, hospital length-of-stay, and hospital price inflation 
have been curtailed, overall hospital cost growth has not been well-controlled due to increases in 
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offset by increases in patient volume, so without other mechanisms to 
control incentives to boost volume, the cost savings may be ephemeral.279 
The fact that Maryland’s was the sole rate setting program to 
survive deregulation was due in part to its unique and valuable Medicare 
waiver that allowed it to include Medicare prices as part of its rate setting 
system, but it also resulted in higher than average Medicare rates.280 
Maryland’s Medicare waiver offset some of the financial pressures 
exerted on the state’s hospitals from the all-payer model and ensured 
continued cooperation from the hospitals. 
To address the volume problem and reign in Medicare spending in 
the state, Maryland has made adjustments to its rate setting program and 
negotiated a new Medicare waiver with the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (“CMS”) starting in 2014.281 Maryland has agreed to 
impose overall limits on per capita hospital spending to counteract 
incentives to increase utilization and to contain its relatively high 
Medicare reimbursements.282 In addition, Maryland must move eighty 
percent of its hospitals’ revenue to population-based payments, the 
principal method for which is a fixed, global budget for hospitals. Under 
the fixed budget, the hospital has a low, but stable profit margin.283 If costs 
exceed revenue, the agency will increase the hospitals’ prices the following 
year to make up for the loss. But if the hospital comes in under budget, 
its prices will be reduced the following year.284 In essence, Maryland has 
moved from hospital rate-setting to rate-setting under a global budget. 
Another variation of an all-payer system allows prices to vary 
between hospitals to preserve competition. This market-based approach 
to rate-setting permits hospitals to charge different prices from each 
other, but the hospital is required to charge each of its payers the same 
price (that is, no price discrimination) and post its percentage markup 
 
 279. See Mark Pauly & Robert Town, Maryland Exceptionalism? All-Payers Regulation and Health 
Care System Efficiency, 37 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 697, 699 (2012); Kevin Outterson, All-Payer Rate 
Setting in JAMA: A “Maryland Miracle?”, Incidental Economist Blog (Sept. 14, 2011, 6:00 AM) 
http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/all-payer-rate-setting-in-jama-a-maryland-miracle/. 
 280. John E. McDonough, Tracking the Demise of State Hospital Rate Setting, 16 Health Aff. 142, 
145 (1997); Lena H. Sun & Sarah Kliff, Maryland Already Sets Hospitals’ Prices. Now It Wants to Cap 
Their Spending, Wash. Post WonkBlog (May 25, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkb
log/wp/2013/05/25/maryland-already-sets-hospitals-prices-now-it-wants-to-cap-their-spending/. 
 281. Maryland All-Payer Model, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., http://innovation.cms. 
gov/initiatives/Maryland-All-Payer-Model/ (last updated Feb. 6, 2015). 
 282. Robert Murray, Maryland’s Bold Experiment in Reversing Fee-for-Service Incentives, Health 
Aff. Blog (Jan. 28, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/01/28/marylands-bold-experiment-in-
reversing-fee-for-service-incentives/; Christine Vestal, Maryland May Be the Model for Curbing 
Hospital Costs, USA Today (Jan. 31, 2014, 10:37 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/20
14/01/31/stateline-maryland-hospital-costs/5079073/. 
 283. Eduardo Porter, Lessons in Maryland for Costs at Hospitals, N.Y. Times (Aug. 27, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/28/business/economy/lessons-in-maryland-for-costs-at-hospitals.html. 
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above the standard rate to allow price comparisons with other 
hospitals.285 This approach maintains price competition among hospitals 
to allow for differences in quality, amenities, or input costs.286 Whatever 
price is reached by the collective insurance negotiation with each hospital 
would be the same price charged to self-pay patients, whether on 
contracted or non-contracted health plans. Like the public utility model, 
this approach would save hospitals the administrative costs of negotiating 
different rates and maintaining separate billing procedures for each 
payer. 
In order to counteract hospital market power and keep prices in 
check for “must-have” providers, insurers combine their bargaining 
power and collectively negotiate with each provider, even if providers 
are permitted to bargain separately.287 Balancing hospitals’ supply-side 
monopolies with insurance buy-side monopsony power could reduce 
price variations based on hospital market power, and whatever variations 
in price that remain between hospitals would better reflect differences in 
quality or amenities. Importantly, allowing insurers to come together to 
bargain collectively with hospitals and providers is not the same thing as 
concentrating the insurance market. The individual health plans would 
still have to compete for their own customers, which would hopefully 
drive down premiums.288 
Outside of Maryland, federal and state efforts to pursue all-payer 
rate setting have been tentative but may be gaining steam.289 The ACA 
created the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, which is 
tasked with testing various payment and health care delivery approaches 
for their ability to contain health care costs while improving quality.290 
The Center encourages states to test all-payer rate setting models that 
include Medicare and Medicaid populations, which some economists 
believe is important to make all-payer systems work well.291 Some states 
have more recently examined all-payer systems, although none have yet 
moved forward to implement such a system.292 
 
 285. See Frakt, supra note 264; Reinhardt, supra note 8, at 66; Reinhardt, A Modest Proposal, 
supra note 269; N.J. Comm’n on Rationalizing Health Care Res., supra note 27, at 100. 
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 291. See Murray, supra note 264, at 1396; Reinhardt, A Modest Proposal, supra note 269. 
 292. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 265, at 2 (describing initiatives in 
Minnesota, Oregon, and Massachusetts to examine some version of all-payer rate setting); N.J. 
H - Fuse Brown_26 (Hamilton12.7) (Do Not Delete) 12/15/2015 6:00 PM 
December 2015]        RESURRECTING HEALTH CARE RATE REGULATION 133 
2. Caps on Negotiated Prices for Private Health Plans 
For those who are skeptical about the ability of regulators to 
actually set hospital prices for all payers, an intermediate option would 
be to establish caps on the prices hospitals can charge private health 
plans or self-pay patients. This system would permit hospitals to continue 
to discriminate amongst payers (charging different payers different rates 
for the same services) and preserve the ability of hospitals to charge 
different prices from each other, but it would limit the extent of price 
variation by imposing a ceiling on prices. A broad cap on private payer 
rates would improve payer bargaining position to resist price increases by 
powerful hospitals or at least put a regulatory backstop on the degree to 
which such hospitals can charge monopoly prices. 
Although we do not have any examples within the United States of 
such a system, Robert Murray, former Executive Director of Maryland’s 
rate setting agency, suggested that the cap could be set as a multiple of 
Medicare rates, such as 150 percent to 175 percent of Medicare.293 More 
recently, health economics and policy experts from Dartmouth suggested 
that all health care prices should be capped at 125 percent of Medicare 
prices for all payers.294 Such a cap would particularly benefit uninsured 
and out-of-network patients who are typically charged the highest prices. 
The cap would thus have similar effects as the fair pricing laws that are 
discussed in the previous section, although it would lack the protections 
against hospital debt collection practices.295 
3. Global Budgets 
Under a global budget system, states impose total revenue limits on 
hospitals to control both prices and utilization.296 A global budget is set 
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prospectively for a hospital or integrated health system to cover the total 
expected health care costs of a defined population for a given time 
period.297 If the hospital or health system exceeds its budget, then it must 
make up for the overrun in the following year’s budget, and if it comes in 
under budget, the hospital can keep the surplus.  
As discussed above, Maryland has begun to implement global 
budgets on top of its rate setting system,298 but a state could move straight 
to regulatory limits on hospital budgets without first establishing 
standalone rate setting. Because hospital revenues are the result of a 
combination of its prices, utilization, and operating costs, regulatory 
oversight of total hospital revenues is a way to control both rates and 
utilization by hospitals.  
Notwithstanding the demise of Vermont’s single payer system,299 in 
2012 the state implemented reforms to constrain total health care 
spending through administrative review of hospital budgets.300 Hospitals 
must submit their proposed budgets to the state’s Green Mountain Care 
Board for review, and then the Board sets an annual budget for each 
hospital based on hospital proposals.301 The Board may adjust a hospital’s 
budget by ordering changes to a hospital’s rates or net revenues, or by 
allowing hospitals to retain or use cash surpluses.302 The Board may 
enforce hospital compliance with agreed upon budgets through court-
ordered injunction or imposition of civil administrative penalties.303 
Vermont’s hospital budget review system is a step toward a global 
budget system, under which the Board would set total payments and 
revenues for hospitals from all payers to manage all of the health care for 
a given population.304 Under the current hospital budget review process, 
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Vermont hospitals still negotiate rates with each commercial payer, but 
under the global budget system the Board would set a uniform rate 
increase for each hospital applicable to all payers, eliminating the 
hospital’s contract negotiations with each payer.305 Both Maryland and 
Vermont have experienced success under their hospital budget 
programs: in its first year with global budgets, Maryland saved more than 
$100 million,306 and Vermont’s hospitals requested a total budget increase 
of just 3.6% for fiscal year 2016.307 Global budgets as implemented in 
Maryland or anticipated in Vermont are more comprehensive than rate 
setting because they incorporate mechanisms to control all the 
components of total health care spending: prices, utilization, and hospital 
operating costs. 
4. Rate Regulation Measured Against Health Care Market Failures 
Rate regulation is the only proposed price-disciplining policy 
solution that addresses the problem of provider market power. 
Administrative rate regulation addresses provider market power by 
administrative price setting through a pure monopsony and removing the 
element of negotiation from hospital pricing, similar to the way Medicare 
sets prices for all participating hospitals.308 Alternatively, the rate setting 
model could combine all payers’ market power in an oligopsony to 
bargain against hospitals on prices.309 By doing away with price 
discrimination within the hospital, all-payer rate setting would reduce 
administrative complexity and costs for providers, simplifying billing, and 
drastically reducing the number of parties with which providers must 
negotiate prices.310 
With respect to information asymmetries, rate regulation could 
promote transparency of price and quality because the prices would be 
publicly available. Therefore, standardized payments and reporting could 
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result in better and more comparable data on prices, product (bundled 
episodes of care), and quality. All-payer rate setting can also be 
augmented with market strategies to address price insensitivity from 
moral hazard. In the market-based approach to rate setting, hospitals are 
permitted to charge different prices from one another, and the different 
prices and quality scores could be used by payers to structure reference 
pricing or tiering programs.311 
Rate regulation reduces the externalities of hospital pricing, because 
under both systems the uninsured or out-of-network patient would not 
be charged unfair or inflated charges. All-payer rate setting eliminates 
price discrimination, and therefore evens out much of the variability and 
disparate pricing that harms the financially vulnerable patient. In 
addition, the prices set through rate setting systems can help hospitals 
internalize the costs borne by financially vulnerable patients by 
incorporating the costs of uncompensated care into the price, much the 
way Medicare adjusts hospital rates.312 Nevertheless, the uninsured 
patient may still struggle to pay her hospital bills even if charged the 
regulated price, and all-payer rate setting does not necessarily address 
balance billing, hospital debt collection practices, or financial assistance 
policies for the most financially vulnerable. Consumer protections could 
be added to an all-payer approach through state funds to reimburse 
hospitals for indigent or uncompensated care and fair debt collection 
laws.313  
The biggest blind spot of rate regulation is that it does not fully 
address the principal-agent problem leading to overutilization of health 
care. As demonstrated by Maryland’s experience, the financial 
constraints imposed on hospitals from rate regulation on a per case basis 
create an incentive to drive up the volume of care.314 Paradoxically, 
providing more health care is not necessarily in the patient’s interests. 
Higher rates of health care utilization result in patient health outcomes 
that are no better, and often worse, than lower utilization.315 Thus, a 
major challenge for designers of systems of rate regulation is to address 
the need to control incentives toward increased utilization. Maryland is 
addressing this problem by moving its hospitals to a global budget, which 
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37 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 679, 684 (2012). 
 312. Murray, supra note 264, at 1397. 
 313. See supra text accompanying notes 247–48. 
 314. Murray, supra note 264, at 1403; Pauly & Town, supra note 279, at 699–700; Outterson, supra 
note 279. 
 315. See Fisher et al., Regional Variations of Medicare Spending Part 2, supra note 202, at 293. 
More health care is worse for patients because every admission, test, or procedure comes with risks of 
complications. See, e.g., Gawande, supra note 69, at 5; Aaron E. Carroll, Doing More for Patients 
Often Does No Good, N.Y. Times (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/13/upshot/doing-
more-for-patients-often-does-no-good-.html. 
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removes the possibility of increasing revenue through increased volume, 
and creates incentives to keep patients healthy within and outside the 
hospital.316 In essence, rate regulation needs to incorporate payment and 
delivery reforms like ACOs to address the principal-agent problems in 
health care. 
Establishing global budgets is no simple matter. Measuring per 
capita spending on a provider basis, creating and reconciling the global 
budget for each provider, and defining the population for which the 
health system will be accountable, are complicated, politically fraught, 
and technically challenging tasks.317 In addition, a global budget system 
inherently shifts risk to health care providers, who may not be equipped 
to manage this financial risk.318 
Despite the challenges, if overall health care spending is to be 
contained, global budgets appear to be an essential component of a rate 
regulation strategy.319 Rate regulation disciplines prices while global 
budgets constrain volume and utilization. 
None of the proposed policy prescriptions in this Part address all of 
the features of health care market failure. The policy prescription 
necessarily must include a combination of approaches. The theory of 
second best posits that if one or more of the market imperfections cannot 
be addressed, then correcting the other market imperfections will not 
necessarily improve patient-consumer welfare and in fact make outcomes 
worse. Fortunately, the policy approaches are mutually reinforcing rather 
than mutually exclusive. A discussion of the implications of the policy-
against-market-failure analysis follows in Part III. 
III.  Resurrecting Health Care Rate Regulation 
Each of the policies has shortcomings, so which policy or combination 
of policies should be adopted to discipline health care prices? Applying the 
policy-against-market-failure framework sheds light on the effectiveness 
of any particular approach to controlling health care prices and reveals a 
dynamic interplay between the various market imperfections and policy 
solutions. 
A. Conclusions for Noncompetitive Provider Markets 
The first and most significant conclusion from a coordinated analysis 
of all the policy solutions is that all approaches except rate regulation fall 
 
 316. See supra text accompanying notes 279–81. 
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 318. Song et al., supra note 296, at 1885–86. 
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short when applied in concentrated health care provider markets. The 
politically popular market approaches (such as price transparency or 
CHDC) and payment and delivery reforms (such as ACOs) will not 
control health care prices in concentrated markets. For noncompetitive 
health care markets, market solutions will be ineffective at disciplining 
provider prices because market solutions rely fundamentally on some 
level of choice among competitors.320 No amount of transparency, 
network narrowing, or consumer skin in the game will provide choices 
where none exist. Without choices, market forces will not have much 
effect on prices. Market strategies have a more limited role for 
noncompetitive markets: to reward high-quality and high-value hospitals 
and ensure adequacy of supply of needed services. If hospitals are 
permitted to charge different rates from each other, then strategies like 
reference pricing and tiering can be used to reward high-value hospitals 
and encourage competition on quality and services.321 
For the increasing proportion of the country with noncompetitive 
provider markets, the only policy that can address the market power of 
providers is rate regulation. There are two policy alternatives to correct 
monopolies: antitrust laws and rate regulation.322 As described above, 
antitrust laws can do little to reverse existing monopolies and bring about 
a competitive market.323 Thus, for noncompetitive provider markets, the 
only solution remaining is rate regulation. Rate regulation addresses 
hospital market power by combining the bargaining leverage of all 
payers together or eliminating price negotiations with payers in favor of 
administratively established rates.324 The inescapable implication of this 
analysis is that for the vast majority of this country with concentrated 
provider markets, health care rate regulation must be a central part of 
any policy strategy to control health care spending. 
A predictable criticism of rate regulation is that it is less efficient 
than markets in determining prices because the agencies or bodies 
charged with setting rates become bogged down in bureaucratic difficulty 
and are subject to agency capture. These concerns point to the sensible 
conclusion that rate regulation is difficult to do well, and highlight the 
importance of institutional design to avoid the capture, bureaucratic 
inefficiency, and crippling complexity that can make rate regulation 
ineffective. Another practical challenge with rate regulation is that it is 
politically unpopular in many jurisdictions, where the tendency is to 
oppose regulation of any sort in favor of letting the market do the job. 
The central conclusion of this article is that notwithstanding these 
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challenges, policymakers have few options other than rate regulation to 
constrain health care prices in concentrated markets. The premise is that 
the market has failed, and in noncompetitive markets, market approaches 
are fundamentally unable to restore the competition necessary for market 
forces to work. 
The second conclusion from this policy-against-market-failure 
analysis is that no single solution or approach is sufficient to address all the 
market failures, and a combination of approaches is necessary to correct the 
numerous health care market imperfections. In noncompetitive provider 
markets, rate regulation should be augmented by payment and delivery 
reforms to address the principal-agent problem of demand inducement by 
physicians that rate regulation fails to correct. 
The policy prescription to discipline prices in noncompetitive health 
care markets starts but does not end with rate regulation. Because health 
care markets suffer from multiple failures, it is insufficient to correct the 
market power problem but not the other imperfections. The theory of 
second best posits that where there are multiple market failures, 
correcting one imperfection but leaving the others unaddressed may not 
improve social welfare, and in some cases, may make consumers worse 
off.325 Rate regulation does not correct the overconsumption of health 
services through provider-induced demand, and we saw that Maryland 
had to modify its all-payer system by constraining total hospital spending 
within global budgets, which creates the financial imperative for hospitals 
to reduce overall health care costs through strategies that look a lot like 
ACOs.326 
Just because rate regulation is necessary to control health care 
prices does not make it easy. Creating an all-payer system that also can 
accommodate innovations in payment and delivery like ACOs can be 
extremely complex, and this complexity can be nettlesome enough to 
sink the entire enterprise.327 Indeed, many of the rate setting programs in 
states other than Maryland were abandoned in the 1980s and 1990s due 
to the inability to incorporate managed care models into the system and 
the belief that rate setting was no longer necessary or desirable in the 
managed care era.328 In addition, rate regulation would almost certainly 
result in lower payments for the most powerful hospitals, so implementing 
rate regulation is politically difficult, unless hospitals otherwise facing 
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financial difficulties see some benefits to rate regulation, such as reduced 
administrative costs and more stable, if constrained, revenues over time.329 
Although prices would be limited for the most vulnerable, ideally 
rate regulation should be augmented with laws that limit hospitals’ debt 
collection and balance billing practices for financially vulnerable patients 
and other consumer protections.330 Even a regulated health care market 
produces externalities that could be curbed with stronger protections for 
individuals who need but cannot afford their health care. 
B. What to Do with Competitive Health Care Markets 
Although no health care market remains highly competitive, there 
are areas scattered throughout the country where the health care provider 
market remains relatively unconcentrated.331 What policies should be 
adopted for these markets? 
The policy-against-market-failure analysis leads to a different set of 
policy prescriptions for competitive health care markets. Here, market 
strategies may be able to constrain hospital prices.332 To harness the 
market pressure on prices, private payers and employers would have to 
collect and report price and quality information in a form that is useful to 
patients, bargain aggressively to create meaningful price options, and 
monitor claims data to ensure value and quality within lower-priced 
options.333 Legislation is necessary to force some of these changes, 
including price and quality transparency requirements at the individual 
or plan level, formation of all-payer claims databases, and legislation to 
prohibit powerful providers from putting anti-tiering clauses in their health 
plan contracts. In order to work, the market approaches for disciplining 
health care prices require nearly as much regulation as rate regulation. 
The second major difference between noncompetitive and 
competitive health care markets is how to address the provider market 
 
 329. Hospitals, especially nonprofit hospitals, are facing significant financial uncertainties as 
Medicare cuts hospital reimbursement rates. See, e.g., Reed Abelson, Nonprofit Hospitals’ 2013 
Revenue Lowest Since Recession, Report Says, N.Y. Times (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/08/27/business/nonprofit-hospitals-2013-revenue-lowest-since-recession-report-says.html. The political 
hurdles to effectuating any of these policy solutions are a related issue that is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 330. See supra notes 248–49. Alternatively, a single-payer approach would offer protections against 
the externalities of hospital prices through universal coverage. 
 331. Cutler & Scott Morton, supra note 17, at 1966 (calculating that one-sixth of hospital markets 
in the United States are unconcentrated, with an HHI between 100 and 1500). 
 332. See, e.g., Avi Dor et al., Medicare’s Hospital Compare Quality Reports Appear to Have Slowed 
Price Increases for Two Major Procedures, 34 Health Aff. 71, 72 (2015); Pauly & Town, supra note 
279, at 706 (arguing that in competitive hospital markets, market approaches (supplemented by 
significant regulatory support, antitrust enforcement, and tax reforms) will be more effective at 
constraining hospital prices than a rate-setting approach). 
 333. See Healthcare Fin. Mgmt. Ass’n, supra note 3, at 3. 
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power problem.334 In competitive markets, market approaches must be 
paired with aggressive antitrust enforcement to prevent further 
concentration or consolidation of the provider market. States could further 
protect competition by reducing barriers to entry and competition caused 
by archaic CON law regimes.335 All of these actions to promote competition 
would likely be opposed by powerful incumbent hospital systems, and are 
therefore politically challenging. 
Although different policy prescriptions emerge for competitive 
versus noncompetitive markets, policymaking is generally done at the 
level of the state, not the individual locality, and no state in the country 
has an entirely competitive health care market.336 It may be unworkable 
to establish a bilateral regulatory system where competitive submarkets 
are permitted to use market approaches to set prices but noncompetitive 
neighbors are subject to rate regulation. Should a state implement rate 
setting where some of its hospital markets remain competitive but others 
are not? 
The answer may depend to what degree the state or its population 
centers are dominated by concentrated versus unconcentrated markets. 
Every sign points to a trend of increasing consolidation, so we can expect 
many of the remaining competitive markets to slide toward 
concentration, and antitrust enforcement has historically failed to prevent 
this loss of competition. Providers and payers everywhere are busy 
implementing ACOs and similar integration strategies to curtail the 
incentives for overutilization and improve quality in health care, but this 
effort comes with an accelerated surge in consolidation. Thus, even for 
the few unconcentrated health care markets remaining, a market-based 
approach to health care price containment may be elusive in practice. 
Conclusion 
We all experience the harms of unpredictable and uncontrollable 
health care prices every time we interact with the health care system, but 
especially when we set foot in a hospital. We hold our breath, wait for 
the bills and (if we are lucky) the mystifying “explanation of benefits” to 
accumulate. We try to make sense of the jargon and codes, and even if 
we have insurance, we have no way of knowing whether we got a good 
price or just got ripped off. If you happen to be uninsured or out-of-
network, the financial nightmare unfolds from there as debt collection 
commences on your bill, wrecking your credit score, raiding your wages 
or home, or worse. The individual harms are compounded by the societal 
 
 334. The rest of the policy prescription for competitive markets looks a lot like noncompetitive 
markets, with payment and delivery reforms to address overutilization and consumer protections to 
correct for externalities imposed on financially vulnerable patients. 
 335. See supra text accompanying notes 48–50. 
 336. See Cutler & Scott Morton, supra note 17, at 1966, fig.3. 
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harms of uncontrolled health care spending (driven in large part by 
unrestrained prices), which drags down our paychecks, savings, and 
resources for all other social programs. Our excess and undisciplined 
health care prices derive from a broken system rife with market failures 
and beg for a regulatory solution. 
So what is a policymaker to do? Policymakers are confronted by a 
menu of policy solutions of mind-boggling complexity. For this reason, it 
is difficult to assess which policy approach to pursue in a given 
jurisdiction. The policy-against-market-failure framework set forth in this 
article provides a method to evaluate the policy approaches 
comprehensively and simultaneously and gauge the policies’ 
effectiveness for a particular market. The clearest message of the policy-
against-market failure analysis is that any effective solution to discipline 
health care prices must contend with the problem of the growing market 
power of the provider. 
The majority of the U.S. population lives in a highly concentrated 
hospital market; for these noncompetitive provider markets, the only 
policy prescription to discipline health care prices is rate regulation to 
address provider market power. Rate regulation alone is insufficient, 
however, and it must be paired with payment and delivery reforms to 
address principal-agent problems and incentives toward overutilization. 
For the minority of the United States that lives in an unconcentrated 
health care market, market approaches like price and quality 
transparency may constrain health care prices, but only to the degree 
that aggressive antitrust enforcement is able to stave off the slide toward 
consolidation. The reality is that the competitive health care market is an 
endangered species, living in an increasingly noncompetitive ecosystem. 
Policymakers at the state level will rarely have the luxury of relying on 
competition to contain health care prices for all markets within their 
state’s borders. To reap the benefits of increased health care integration 
and coordination, perhaps the best option is to accept the inevitable 
consolidation of health care providers but regulate prices like a utility. 
The story of our unchecked health care spending in the United 
States is a story about high and undisciplined prices. Our health care 
pricing problem is driven at its core by a growing provider monopoly 
problem. The only policy capable of addressing the provider monopoly 
problem is rate regulation. The inescapable conclusion is that we must 
resurrect health care rate regulation and place it in the center of any 
policy approach to control our health care spending. 
 
 
 
 
 
